CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 25 June 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Paul O'Sullivan (Australia)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 626th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset I wish to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Chile, His Excellency Dr. Edmundo Vargas, who will be addressing us today. Dr. Vargas is a well-known jurist, a specialist in international affairs with an outstanding academic background. He is at present member of the International Law Commission, a body to which he was recently elected, and was Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a post to which he contributed his wide knowledge of law together with his strong commitment to individual liberties. I am sure that the Conference will follow his statement with particular interest.

I wish also to use this opportunity to note the presence among us today of Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, who is leaving the United Nations after having been Director of UNIDIR for the past five years. He has performed his duties in that sensitive position in an outstanding manner, having combined his knowledge of the subject of disarmament with his tact and competence as an able diplomat who knows our Conference very well, having served in it with distinction, if I may say so. He is now returning to his Foreign Service and I wish him, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, every success in his future responsibilities. I might also say that Ambassador Dhanaphala is an alumnus of the Australian Foreign Service training course, and I don't know whether his subsequent distinguished career is because of, or in spite of, that background, but I will let him address that.

As this is the first plenary meeting of the Australian presidency of the Conference, I should now like to make an opening statement.

I would like at the outset to pay tribute to the service to this Conference of my two predecessors, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria and Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina. Both gave exemplary demonstrations of what it means to be President of the Conference and to represent the interests of all its members. I will try to emulate the high standards of professionalism, competence, tolerance and mutual respect which they exhibited. I should also like to offer a formal word of welcome to our recently arrived colleagues, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan.

Both within and outside this Conference recent days and weeks have seen remarkable developments in the areas of disarmament and arms control. If you permit me, I would like to make some brief observations. The dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons agreed on 16 June by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin are the latest evidence of how profoundly our world has changed with the ending of the cold war. This is yet another proof that disarmament and arms control have to be viewed in a totally different perspective, as Under-Secretary-General Petrovsky reminded us on 14 May. The nuclear arms

(The President)

race, as it was so characterized, is clearly in a downward spiral at least as far as the two major possessors are concerned. It should result in the consolidation of strategic stability with the transition from multiple-warhead to single-warhead ICMBs and the lowering of total numbers of nuclear weapons.

In thinking about how to structure disarmament discussions, how to reform our agenda and our membership, we should not, in my view, overlook the continuing necessity of binding legal instruments that are soundly based on multilateral cooperation. The way in which that cooperation itself is accomplished will shape the psychologicl environment - the ideas - with which we work, and hence eventually the outcome in security and other related areas.

Of course even here a word of caution is necessary: the lifting of the restraints imposed by the cold war has led to contradictory results. On the one hand there is the wholly welcome improvement in relations between the United States and Russia. This is of vital importance to all of us because it lifts the nuclear cloud that has cast its dark and menacing shadow over our world for the past 40 years. It is truly worthwhile to note the invigorating boost and the opening of so many new possibilities that are provided by the cut-back in nuclear weapons and the ending of the cold war.

But even as, rightly, we celebrate this improvement in international relations, we cannot but be struck by the grim fact that ancient conflicts are forcing their way back on to our consciousness. The era of ideological competition may be over, but its ending appears to have unleashed in many regions ethnic, religious and social ferment. The economic disparities between nations are expanding not reducing, and as Ambassador Zahran reminded us last week, new and global issues are demanding the attention of senior decision makers.

In this world of increasing complexity, challenges to security may, for many countries, be increasing. And these challenges will be harder to handle because of the lingering after-effects of the cold war: the continuation of certain regional tensions; the excessive distribution of conventional arms; the decision of a few to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

In this new world, the Conference on Disarmament should play a useful role. It should negotiate new instruments to create and embody norms of behaviour that lead to greater security at lower levels of armaments. It should institutionalize that multilateral cooperation to which I referred by producing agreements that would be practical instruments of inter-State cooperation and enhanced security. It should be characterized by flexible and creative approaches to arms control and disarmament. Whether it will indeed play such a role is the challenge for us in this Conference. It would be a fateful indicator of the prospects for international cooperation for instance if the CWC cannot be successfully adopted in our next session.

(The President)

But conversely, if we are indeed able, while respecting our differences and subordinating our maximum wishes, to reach a level of mutual tolerance that provides us with a concrete result in the form of a CWC, we will have sound reason to be optimistic about our capacity to make other wise judgements. We will send a signal that the Conference on Disarmament has a role to play in the new environment in which we find ourselves.

In this regard I should like to recall just how complex and demanding the task is of concluding the chemical weapons convention. As you know, I have had the opportunity of representing my Government in a number of bilateral and regional consultations about the CWC. In every case, my interlocutors have been struck by the ambition of the enterprise here: its technical complexity and political sensitivity. This agreement has been in gestation for so long precisely because it is difficult to achieve the combination of political leadership, industrial support and bureaucratic acceptance that is needed across so many countries and by so many interested individuals and groups.

Yet for all that, we are almost there. Six and a half decades after our predecessors could agree on a one-page Protocol banning, in effect, the first use of chemical weapons, we are on the verge of completing that job, making the ban comprehensive, providing for its verification and enhancing our security by this form of cooperation. There may indeed be some costs in implementing the complex text, as the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Velayati, frankly reminded us last week, and we should not ignore those costs. But there will also be the benefits of improved security and an equal commercial basis for trade in relevant chemicals. On balance it will be a good deal, and we will all be better off with this treaty than we would be without it.

In this connection I am pleased to report to the Conference on Disarmament on the results of a meeting of South-East Asia and South Pacific States held in Sydney over last week-end earlier this week. Twenty-four regional States met for the fourth meeting of the Chemical Weapons Regional Initiative launched by the Australian Prime Minister in 1988 to consider how to prepare for the implementation of the chemical weapons convention. At the conclusion of the seminar a statement was issued, and I have asked the secretariat to distribute it as a document of this Conference. In that statement all participants noted that their countries were not producers of chemical weapons and had no intention of developing, stockpiling, deploying or using such weapons. They confirmed that their Governments were giving favourable consideration to the call by the United Nations General Assembly for all States to commit themselves to becoming original States parties to the chemical weapons convention. In preparation for signature of the convention, and as a confidence-building exercise in the region, participants recommended that their Governments exchange statements containing such declarations on chemical-weapons-relevant matters as will be required under the chemical weapons convention and as provided for in WP.400/Rev.1.

(The President)

Because of our dialogue with our regional partners Australia is conscious of the demands which the CWC will place on developing countries, particularly those small States with limited bureaucratic and administrative resources. We stand ready to assist our regional colleagues in developing their knowledge and understanding of the convention and in developing appropriate legislative and administrative responses in order to discharge their obligations effectively. Australia's Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, has said to our neighbours that costs alone should not be a reason for any regional State to decide against participation in the Convention.

For the immediate future, of course, we have specific tasks. We now have, thanks to the great work of Ambassador von Wagner and his team, a draft chemical weapons convention. We will need to consider it together during the coming inter-sessional period and then exchange views about it on our resumption of formal meetings on 20 July. We have had yesterday, and will have later today and tomorrow, the opportunity to hear Ambassador von Wagner explain the contents and the balance of his draft. We are going to have to come to grips with some difficult choices, putting aside what any individual State might prefer in the interests of the collective good. There is no doubt that we are now at one of those points where individuals, international institutions and national Governments have to find common ground even if some pain is involved.

In this respect Senator Evans commented earlier today, and I quote him: "While WP.400/Rev.1 is not in every respect our preferred outcome, ... that is the nature of any compromise text. Everyone will have to give up some of their ideal positions. While reserving final judgement, I believe that this text will be effective in providing a convention which dramatically advances the cause of global disarmament. The world community must seize this opportunity. No one will claim that the most complex and instrusive international instrument ever established, and the CW convention will be just that, is going to be perfect. But it can and will provide practical means, for the first time ever, for the international community to prevent the production, acquisition, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons." That concludes my statement.

I would like to recall that today, immediately following the plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

I have on my list of speakers for this meeting the representatives of Chile, Canada, Finland and Myanmar. I now give the floor to His Excellency the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Chile, Dr. Edmundo Vargas.

Mr. VARGAS (Chile) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, it is a great honour for me to address this meeting of the Conference on Disarmament at a time when you are taking up the post of president of this important body on behalf of Australia, with which we share an active presence in the Pacific Ocean, which we wish to convert into a genuine area of peace and cooperation. I also wish to pay tribute to the effective work accomplished by your predecessor, Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina, a country to which we are bound by so many very close ties.

The Conference has been, and will continue to be, the sole forum for negotiations on disarmament. In it, treaties have been prepared that represent very significant contributions to the concept of global security. After the discouraging lack of progress of recent years, a whole catalogue of opportunities has arisen to make progress resolutely towards limiting conventional weapons, banning weapons of mass destruction and strengthening comprehensive security. The shape of the world scenario has undergone marked change: the collapse of the walls that oppressed and divided, the virtual disappearance of the blocs, the incipient emergence of a new order whose scope and favourable repercussions are not yet clearly perceived by developing nations. Yet the enormous spiral of expenditure on the arms race, the deterioration of the environment and cruel and acute social tensions persist, while new ethnic and national conflicts arise. As the late Chilean Ambassador and political leader, Radomiro Tomic, said at the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament, "The contradictions between the longing for peace eagerly shared by mankind and the insane pace of the arms build-up - $2 million every minute! - and the blood-stained use of weapons on an increasingly threatening scale, particularly in the last 50 years, from the framework within which our deliberations on disarmament are taking place." From the very moment when those words were uttered, we have witnessed events that are major landmarks along the path towards a new concept of security, conceived as a shared value and one that is constantly expanding.

First of all, agreements arduously reached have been fully implemented. The 1987 Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, which set 1991 as the deadline for the total elimination of one category of nuclear weapons, has been fully observed. Others have helped stimulate broader negotiations in the multilateral area, as with the 1990 agreement between the United States and the former Soviet Union that laid down a timetable for the destruction of chemical weapons.

Second, the negotiations that culminated in the Treaty on strategic arms reductions (START), which brought about an almost unprecedented reduction in intercontinental nuclear delivery systems, were endorsed and confirmed by the Lisbon Protocol and subsequently received an even more decisive impetus with the recent agreement between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with parameters which would have been unimaginable even for experts until just recently.

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Third, the extraordinary progress in the area of European security based on the Treaty on conventional forces and the changes that have occurred in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which, as it incorporates ever more fully the values that are shared by all its member States, is going to occupy an ever more preponderant role in the international equilibrium.

Fourth, a revaluation of denuclearized zones, becoming particularly obvious starting with the reunification of Germany, the policy of the Central European States and the decision by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to become non-nuclear-weapon States; the decision taken by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity last May and the initiative taken by President Mubarak of Egypt on the Middle East scene.

Fifth, a trend that can be seen through the statistics published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on the international arms trade, which shows that both the change in the international climate and the success of certain negotiations on disarmament, together with financial restrictions, have led to fewer opportunities for arms production and increased pressure for the conversion of the arms industry. In this connection, we attach particular importance to the international register of arms transfers, the creation of which has been approved by the General Assembly, and which in this Conference has been translated into the establishment of a specific ad hoc committee for this subject.

Sixth and last, I would not wish to omit mentioning that in the Latin American context very major steps have been taken in this area, such as the proposal by Chile, Argentina and Brazil to revitalize the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Mendoza Agreement, entered into by the same three countries, establishing a total and absolute ban on chemical and biological weapons.

In order for these trends to become a broad and irreversible process in efforts to secure disarmament, security and peace, it is essential to have both a clear idea of the targets that can realistically be aimed for and also a firm political will and a strategy appropriate to these ends. Frankly, I must say that at present we are noting with misgivings the lack of positive results, the mechanical repetition of resolutions without any visible follow-up, and the purely theoretical formulation of many items that, because they link disarmament to human rights and the development of justice and international cooperation, are crucial. Yet this has not led to a genuine modification of the threats to international security. The destructive role still being played by regional conflicts, the desperate economic emergencies in a number of regions of the world, including the situation in many African countries in which the emergency has become a permanent reality; the justified concern of the island countries of the Pacific at the effects of global warming; the unlimited cruelty of the hostilities that are taking place in former Yugoslavia; the persistence of the Middle East problem, which urgently calls for a just and comprehensive solution; and the difficulties facing the

(Mr. Vargas, Chile)

nations with economies in transition that, freed from the yoke of centralization, are seeking both a return to their own identity and their necessary insertion into the international community. In this context it is essential to define the major priorities clearly. In this regard, we think that the present agenda and the procedures of the Conference on Disarmament urgently need to be brought into line with the new times following the end of the cold war, so that they really grapple with questions of vital importance for the enhancement of world security and stability.

Apart from the broad issue of general disarmament, I wish to underscore, as subjects of special urgency, the total cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, what are known as security assurances for non-nuclear States, the total prohibition of chemical weapons, the protection of outer space and the item that is being analysed by the Disarmament Commission relating to the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields.

The first priority is the approval of the convention that will ban chemical weapons once and for all. The Mendoza Agreement signed by my country along with Argentina and Brazil, to which I referred earlier, which has received major support from other Latin American countries in the region, offers further testimony of our will for peace. We wish to be among the first to sign the future convention on chemical weapons and to play an active role in its executive council, which must be formed with a feeling for regional balance and efficiency. We also think that the follow-up machinery and confidence-building measures provided for in the draft that was submitted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this week will constitute a decisive step in the revitalization of this very important body. In this connection, the efforts and the efficient work carried out by Ambassasdor von Wagner of Germany in discharging his function as Chairman of the aforesaid Committee deserve all the praise my country can offer. My Government will give very careful consideration to the draft, but as of now I can tell you that once these negotiations have been completed, crowning with success 24 years of illusions, ideals and efforts, Chile will be pleased to offer to host a regional seminar to provide information about the salient features of this agreement, particularly its verification and inspection machinery, so that countries are in a better position to implement this important convention.

Let us also recall that the cessation of nuclear testing was proposed for the first time in 1954 by the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India. Since then, major efforts have been made in the United Nations, in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, in PTBT review Conference and at the third and fourth NPT review conferences. Never has a measure limiting nuclear weapons been the object of so much dedication for so long and with so much persistence. It is our hope that the voluntary moratorium announced by Russia and France will become a permanent reality and that soon a treaty on a complete nuclear test ban can be agreed which will be the expression of a genuine and universal regime of non-proliferation.

(Mr. Vargas, Chile)

The question of security assurances, which was considered during the NPT review conference, led to the five States that have admitted to possessing nuclear weapons demonstrating their readiness to reaffirm their previous unilateral declarations on the non-use of such weapons against non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. However, that statement was then considered insufficient. This fragile situation prompts the following thoughts on our part: in Latin America we have the good fortune to have managed to get these five States to sign Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, converting into a legally binding commitment that which in other regions is only a declaration of intent. Why not do the same with the Protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga? Chile, as a Pacific country, calls on the nuclear Powers to confirm these negative assurances, which are also valid for the Antarctic and the Pacific Ocean, but which are of course valid also for the whole of man's universe.

In the past, there was a justified concern to avoid any military-type deployments in outer space. Today there is an equally justified concern about security in space. It has been calculated that there are at present approximately 6,500 space objects in orbit around the Earth which together weigh 2 million kilograms. But only about 6 per cent of them are really functional satellites, with the remainder falling into the category of space debris. In the face of other challenges, the question of space debris, within the broader concept of peaceful, secure and non-polluted outer space, does not have the same urgency as the above problems, but the international community included it in a somewhat selective way in the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its last session on the peaceful uses of outer space.

I have left to the end an aspect which is certainly not the last in terms of priorities, but it is the most complex one in the quest for a solution: the role of science and technology in disarmament, security and development. We have observed with interest the recent events in the framework of the technological development of weapons systems and the efforts that groups of countries are making to control the spread of nuclear technologies, dual technologies and ballistic missiles, through the "London Club" of nuclear suppliers, the Missile Technology Control Regime and also the group of the five major weapons exporters. We note that any regime for technology control is fragile and transitory by nature. Yet the progress of science and technology is an irresistible process that cannot be halted through treaties, agreements or national legislation.

The efforts that I have referred to are laudable, but they should be guided into multilateral channels. There will indeed be proliferation of nuclear weapons unless tests stop and all atomic arsenals are gradually disarmed. If progress is made towards their total prohibition, by means of regional agreements that would culminate in a multilateral convention similar to the one which seeks to prohibit chemical weapons, the objective of ending missile proliferation will have been attained.

(Mr. Vargas, Chile)

Technological development is closely connected with two other major concerns of mankind: the conversion of the arms industries, which presents enormous difficulties of all kinds, especially for the protection of the environment, as has been seen in the negotiations on chemical weapons. Another concern, which has been included, like the previous ones, in the chapter on the development of legal instruments in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development's Agenda 21, has to do with nuclear safety, which is seriously threatened by the obsolescence of nuclear plants, the dumping of nuclear waste in the oceans and the improper management of such waste. The debate on conversion runs the risk of being too theoretical. An interesting key is to be found in the prospect of the environmental applications of military technologies, as dealt with by the General Assembly in resolution 44/228. In Chile, the Minister of Defence, Dr. Patricio Rojas, scheduled a seminar which offered an opportunity to learn how defence agencies had compiled valuable data on oceans, marine ice, the Antarctic, atmospheric pollution, natural resources, the atmosphere, hydrological systems, soils, various ecosystems and other environmental processes. The relationship between the environment and military technologies was also of interest to the Rio conference that urged continuation of work to enhance protection of the environment from any mass attempts to cause destruction on a large scale in times of armed conflict. Chile is taking the necessary steps to accede to the 1977 Convention on environmental modification techniques, and is also prepared to participate in efforts to broaden the Geneva protocols and conventions on international humanitarian law in order to mitigate the impact of military activities on the environment.

Chile wants a planet that is free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear waste and toxic residues. On the initiative of my country, the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty designates Antarctica as an area devoted to peace and science. In the 200 miles of Chile's exclusive economic zone, as well as that of the other countries of the South Pacific system (Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Panama), the dumping of nuclear and toxic wastes is absolutely banned. We took pains to uphold this same position at the Rio Conference on Environment and Development. The initiative that we took together with Argentina and Brazil to strengthen the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been defined as a technical one, to modernize and adapt this extremely important instrument without altering its political integrity. If this objective is reached, Latin America will have made a very special contribution to the cause of non-proliferation through the development of safeguards and, above all, of the system of special inspections. The Treaty contains a provision which is a dead letter because of the lack of a procedure for organization and implementation, and of a corps of suitable inspectors. The new rules that have been proposed hand this task over to the International Atomic Energy Agency, but at the same time give it a mandate that goes beyond the limitations of the present safeguard agreements of the Vienna Agency enable it to cope with the challenge of possible violations of the NPT, Rarotonga or Tlatelolco, which up to now have had no realistic machinery for sanctions.

(Mr. Vargas, Chile)

A clear horizon, a protected environment, sustainable development founded on solidarity, outline the sources of our aspirations. But they imply following a new path, traced within a modulus of international cooperation, capable of creating greater rationality in the entire spectrum of inter-State relations and dispelling any possible threat scenarios. In order to make progress in this direction, there are certain essential principles to guide us. The first of them is that because of its universal nature, the United Nations is the most appropriate and, to a certain extent, the only appropriate place to forge a consensus on the major problems of security and disarmament. However, no initiative can be pursued properly if there is no change in the rigid procedures of United Nations bodies and this Conference of Disarmament, which are insufficiently democratic and representative. We can hardly speak of a new world order when the bodies entrusted with instituting it have no mandate and some of the subject-matter is dealt with in the secrecy of informal consultations. The subject of the expansion of the Conference brooks no further delay and my country, like others, has the legitimate right to become a full member of this body.

Another basic principle is related to the modern concept of security, which links it firmly to development, the eradication of poverty and the elimination of international tensions. In this connection, as a legal expert, I attach great importance to renunciation of the use of force, systems of peaceful settlement, peace-keeping operations and compliance with treaties and other international commitments. It is also necessary to appreciate the evolution of the strategic doctrine which leads us to the level of reasonable sufficiency for defence, conceived in the way which is most in keeping with the material capabilities and human resources of each nation.

This last argument is founded on the conviction that the new international order should be preceded by the preparation, at the regional level, of a set of measures that would increase confidence among all the members of each society. To this end, Chile wishes to propose that the possibility of convening in the near future a regional conference on mutual confidence-building and security-building measures should be studied in Latin America. Transparency in identification, analysis and decision-making when faced with shared opportunities; the strength provided by shared values in the defence of human rights and stability in democratic coexistence; and the shared perception by all the Governments of the region that Latin America, true to its tradition and destiny, must make its own irreplaceable contribution to the establishment of new structures, new practices and a new form of civilization which is being reborn after decades of suffering and adversity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Chile for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Mr. Robertson.

Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada): Mr. President, since this will be the first Canadian intervention since your assumption of the presidency, let me begin by expressing our pleasure that, at a really crucial phase of the work of the CD, we will be guided by someone of such proven skill and competence. Your term in office will see us through virtually the final phase of the CWC negotiations as well as the production of the major elements of our report to the forty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly - the technical part and the reports of the ad hoc committees, special coordinators, etc. Australia has already played a key role in the CWC process, not only in the past but earlier this year in pushing forward our work on the CWC through the tabling by Senator Evans of your model text, and also for example in Ron Morris' work on article VI verification and your own recent efforts as moderator. We in the Canadian delegation are confident that you will provide the determined leadership required during the coming key weeks of our work. I would also like to take this opportunity to express our thanks and appreciation for the contributions of your two immediate predecessors, Ambassadors Semichi of Algeria and García Moritán of Argentina. Finally, I would like to say a special farewell to our departing colleagues, Ambassadors Rasaputram of Sri Lanka and Calovski of Yugoslavia, and to my friend Jayantha Dhanapala, with all of whom we in our delegation have had such excellent relations.

Clearly the achievement by the close of our work this year of an effective CW convention must continue to be our main collective priority. Canada's own commitment to that goal has been made perfectly clear already, through our long-standing and ongoing participation in the work of the ad hoc committee and its various subgroups, so ably and dynamically led by Ambassador von Wagner. Today, however, I am not going to speak about our work on the CWC. Instead, I shall focus on another equally, indeed possibly even more, important issue: that of nuclear weapons, the dangers of their proliferation, and the need for a nuclear test ban. In addressing these issues today I do so in the ironic context of the fact that, even as the second phase of our 1992 CD session draws to its close, it has not yet been possible for us to reach agreement on setting up an ad hoc committee on this agenda item.

Just over a month ago, on 21 May, the Canadian Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, delivered a commencement address to the graduating class of Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. He used that occasion to outline a new seven-point plan for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and it is the essentials of that plan that I now intend to share with you.

Noting that the defeat of communism had opened the door to democracy but that it had also brought economic hardship to some 425 million people throughout Central and Eastern Europe, Mr. Mulroney stated that in Canada we sympathized with the magnitude of the challenge that President Yeltsin, President Kravchuk and others are struggling with as they try to lead their nations into democracy and economic reform simultaneously. He expressed the view that the overall Western response to these needs had so far at best been hesitant but that Canada had itself been active. To the end of 1991, Canada,

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with a relatively small population only approaching 28 million, had already disbursed over $1.6 billion in credits and aid to the former Soviet Union, the second highest per capita assistance of the G-7, exceeded only by that of Germany. In 1992, Canada was providng an amount approaching a further billion dollars, for a total of almost $2.5 billion in Canadian assistance. To promote exports by the countries of the former Soviet Union, Canada had gone beyond most-favoured-nation tariff levels and was granting preferential tariff treatment as low as zero tariffs in some categories.

The Prime Minister, however, also highlighted the fact that the distintegration of the Soviet Union had also raised the ominous spectre of ethnic conflict and of possible economic collapse. He considered that these factors, taken together, had also seriously multiplied the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

Noting the magnitude of the economic problems Russia and the other States of the CIS now face, he suggested that the potential for ethnic conflict was an urgent, potentially dangerous problem for everyone, especially considering that some 25 million ethnic Russians live now as minorities in the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, that many borders there are in dispute, that the economy of the former Soviet Union had shrunk by 17 per cent last year and that in Russia it will fall back a further 15 or even 20 per cent this year. There was as well, he noted, religious ferment, ethnic hatreds that have boiled over and still a somewhat uneasy relationship between Kiev and Moscow. In our Prime Minister's view the greatest single threat to world peace today now comes potentially from the thousands of nuclear weapons stored in these suddently impoverished and politically volatile countries of the former Soviet Union. Vast amounts of nuclear-weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium are now stockpiled there. If one couples these facts with the nuclear ambitions of a few international pariah States, to use his words, the dangers are unmistakable. Canadians and people everywhere had applauded the earlier far-reaching nuclear weapons reduction moves by President Bush and President Yeltsin. In Canada's view it was urgent that the START cuts agreed upon in July 1991 be ratified and implemented as soon as possible, which is why we were also very pleased by the progress made on strategic weapons issues by President Bush in his recent meetings with President Kravchuk of the Ukraine and President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. Last week's agreement between Presidents Bush and Yelsin on even deeper cuts in nuclear weapons arsenals was of such extraordinary significance that it virtually overshadowed another very important announcement, that of 15 June by the British Minister of Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, of the unilateral decision of the Government of the United Kingdom to reduce, and in some instances entirely eliminate, naval and maritime air tactical nuclear weapons. I am pleased to note that that statement has just been circulated as a CD document.

(Mr. Robertson, Canada)

While Canada heartily welcomes these moves, even deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals, by all the nuclear-weapons Powers, to the lowest possible level consistent with effective nuclear deterrence, are in our view still called for. We believe this would make good security and also economic sense for all concerned, including the United States, which Mr. Mulroney, in his statement, had suggested no doubt could find places at home to spend any eventual savings that might accrue from such cuts.

The Prime Minister then went on to state that Canada would be prepared to join in an international programme to assist the countries of the former Soviet Union in the destruction of nuclear weapons. We regarded the reduction of super-Power weapons stockpiles as vital for its own sake and as crucial to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear-weapons States. Nothing is more important in Canada's view than the prevention of such nuclear proliferation. There is no room at all for slippage on this issue. To give substance to this concern, Prime Minister Mulroney then outlined several important steps he suggested the world community should take to make sure such proliferation does not happen. These steps were as follows.

First, it is imperative that the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty regime be strengthened when the Treaty comes up for review in 1995. All countries must accede to it. And it must be extended indefinitely. To that end the Prime Minister stated that, as part of an effective international effort - I repeat, as part of an effective international effort - Canada would be prepared to terminate all of its economic cooperation programmes, including aid and tariff preferences, with any country, including the new republics of the former Soviet Union, that undermines the non-proliferation Treaty, through action or inaction.

Second, nuclear cheating must be stopped. To stop the cheating, the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency must be strengthened and its resources increased. The budget of IAEA is currently some $180 million per year, or about half the cost of one B-1 bomber. Canada will support giving IAEA the teeth - the authority and the resources - to inspect any country at any time. We will also support United Nations Security Council action to force compliance with international rules, as is currently being done with respect to Iraq.

Third, controls must be tightened on the export of nuclear weapons technologies.

Fourth, the sale of nuclear brainpower to pariah States wishing to develop or strengthen their nuclear weapons potential must be stopped. It is extremely dangerous to world peace when highly skilled nuclear scientists, who in Russia now earn literally less than garbage collectors in the West, are likely to be driven by economic hardship to accept offers to work in rogue countries with the purpose of assisting them in putting together a nuclear weapons capability. The creation, under United States leadership, of

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international science and technology centres in the countries of the former Soviet Union to employ nuclear scientists and engineers is, therefore, in our view wise and timely. Canada is prepared to help lead in the funding and financing of such a centre in Kiev.

Fifth, security cooperation must be strengthened regionally so as to reduce the underlying causes of tension, particularly in global hot spots such as the Indian subcontinent, the Korean peninsula and in the Middle East.

Sixth, the basic bargain implicit in the non-proliferation Treaty is a commitment of the nuclear Powers to reduce nuclear weapons in return for a commitment by the non-nuclear Powers not to acquire any such weapons. The 1995 review conference must confirm that bargain. To pave the way, our Prime Minister suggested that it would be reasonable for all nuclear-weapons States to agree now on a moratorium on testing these weapons. In his view France deserved full marks for its unilateral moratorium announced in April.

Seventh and finally, it would also be reasonable for those States which have acquired nuclear weapons to give assurances to all those countries, including Canada, which have signed the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons States, that such weapons will never be used against them.

If progress could be made on these seven points, said Mr. Mulroney, that would give to all of us a much safer and better world.

In some respects these seven new proposals do no more than reflect long-standing Canadian policies in the nuclear non-proliferation field. In other aspects, however, they go much further than we have in the past. They are the manifestation of our real and serious concerns and the demonstration of a solid commitment by Canada to try to resolve those concerns, concerns which surely almost all of us who participate in the work of the CD must share. It is our hope that, with the support of like-minded countries from all regions of the world, it will indeed prove possible to make progress in an area, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, which threatens all of us, nuclear and non-nuclear States alike.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, Dr. Rautio.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): Mr. President, the delegation of Finland associates itself with the words of pleasure expressed by the previous speakers to you, Sir, when you today assumed the presidency of this Conference.

I have asked for the floor to introduce the latest "blue book" which has been circulated as a CD document (CD/1155). The "blue book" of the year is a joint report of laboratories which participated in the third round-robin test. In my presentation today, I will mainly deal with the conclusions of the test that are of more general interest than the analytical details.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

The third round-robin test comprised two parts, an analytical laboratory exercise and a written study. The laboratory exercise simulated the kind of analyses that will be carried out in accredited laboratories under the future convention. The Netherlands undertook to prepare the samples. As samples in the future will have to be sent to accredited laboratories, a written study on procedures for sampling, sample preservation, packaging, coding, methods to guarantee sample integrity, transportation, and storage in laboratories was carried out as the second part of the third round-robin test. Both the analytical test and the written study on sampling and transportation were coordinated by Finland.

The aim of the laboratory exercise was to analyse and unambiguously identify scheduled compounds and related materials in three matrices: concrete, paint and rubber, associated with the inspection of a military facility. In addition, laboratories would report on the methods employed for analysis of these samples and the criteria and instrumental methods used for the identification and confirmation of the chemicals of interest. Only chemicals belonging to schedules 1-3 and any related chemicals for which agreed-upon identification criteria were met were to be reported to the coordinating laboratory.

The aim of the written study was to collect experiences and views of the participating laboratories on the aspects of sampling and transportation of samples. These topics are extremely important for the whole verification procedure.

The three sample matrices were spiked with chemicals belonging to the mustard family, agents and their degradation products. Chemical background was added to the samples to simulate a realistic situation in military facilities. The samples emphasized very well the difficulties involved in the identification of trace levels of chemicals in samples with high chemical background.

The laboratories knew that the samples were to simulate those collected at a military facility, but regretted the lack of identification of the blank samples. This time the identification of blanks had been left to the laboratories, and this precluded their use for testing the recoveries of identified chemicals. On the other hand, the detection of scheduled chemicals in the blanks served to underline the importance of including unidentified blanks among the samples to test for cross-contamination. Inclusion of unidentified blanks among the samples to be delivered to laboratories by the technical secretariat has now been added to the recommended procedures for handling background and control samples.

In this test three laboratories were able to use only one spectrometric technique, and this means that their results do not meet the criteria for unambiguous identification.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

Some laboratories reported mustard degradation products which were not unambiguously identified. This can be considered acceptable as long as the parent schedule 1 compounds, mustard or its derivatives, were unambiguously identified. If only degradation products are found, however, their identification must be unambiguous. Degradation products are of less value for verification than the parent compounds. In this test, reporting of degradation products was considered important since as yet there is no comprehensive list of all degradation products relevant to the future convention.

The third round-robin also underlined the importance of thorough discussons among the experts within a laboratory. Not even three spectrometric techniques are reliable enough if the results are not drawn together for final identification of relevant compounds. One senior person should be responsible for checking the consistency of the results obtained with each technique and for accepting the final report. In the course of the work, the senior person could also ask for more experiments to clarify ambiguities between results obtained by different methods.

Stringent quality control and quality assurance programmes will be extremely important for the future accredited laboratories. Quality control procedures will be required to allow the laboratories to assure the technical secretariat of the accountability and traceability of data. The quality of the reported mass spectrometric data underlined the need for guidelines for data recording and quality control.

In addition to controlling the quality of instrumental methods, it is very important to control the quality of the whole analytical procedure, including sample preparation. Testing of sample preparation methods would reveal any cross-contamination in the laboratory. Correct interpretation of the analytical results is important, as demonstrated by the detection of mustard in samples containing thiodiglycol after their treatment with clorinating agent.

For the first time, false identifications of schedule 1 chemicals were made in the round-robin tests. The reasons for the errors differed for the different compounds and laboratories. For VX and BZ the mass spectra were of poor quality, and although they showed some points in common with the reference spectra of pure VX and BZ, the fit was very poor. Only one spectrometric method was used for identification.

Mustard was erroneously identified by three laboratories in concrete samples. One laboratory reported mustard on the basis of retention data, although no mass spectrometric confirmation was obtained. Another laboratory had probably added chlorinating agent to the samples, resulting in the conversion of thiodiglycol to mustard. For the third laboratory the reason is not clear.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

Detection of alkyl methylphosphonates and thiodiglycol at trace level in many of the blanks and spiked samples points out the danger of cross-contamination in the laboratory. One laboratory unambiguously identified methylphosphonic acid and methyl methylphosphonate in the blank concrete sample. Cross-contamination in the laboratory was eliminated by checking all solvents, reagents and glassware. Methyl methylphosphonate was not present in the laboratory as a reference compound. The origin of the chemicals in the blank remained unclear.

The analytical part of the "rolling text" of recommended operating procedures was enlarged by several new methods. New procedures were compiled for tasks related to the written study on sampling and transportation of samples. Some of these new procedures incited considerable discussion between the laboratories, and compromises, for example, in sampling procedures, have been made for practical reasons. The new procedures should help the future technical secretariat in the planning of its first inspections.

Round-robin 3 revealed the need of the future technical secretariat for many accredited laboratories. Laboratories may not be available for analyses at all times. Down time for equipment failure or installation of new units, sickness or departure of key scientists, and too tight a work schedule - all these are normal occurrences in analytical laboratories. A network of laboratories would enable the technical secretariat to select for a particular task those laboratories that can perform the task reliably and quickly.

This test also showed the necessity for an accreditation process. New laboratories should be accredited only after their performance has been tested and approved. Laboratories must be equipped with instruments allowing unambiguous identification, skilled analysts must be available, and quality control procedures must be implemented.

Concrete, paint, and rubber were shown to be good sample matrices for verification analysis because mustard agents and related degradation products can be isolated and identified from these matrices. Sample preparation does not require overly complex methods, so these matrices are also feasible for on-site use. The test showed that on-site analysis would have identified samples that required confirmatory analyses in off-site laboratories. In this case the spiking chemicals were relatively stable in the selected matrices and were easily detected even three to five weeks after preparation of the actual samples.

The detection of false positive chemicals emphasizes the importance of accepted identification criteria, quality control and quality assurance procedures, and interpretation of data. Solving the problems of transportation of toxic chemicals will require further negotiations with authorities responsible for the safety of air traffic.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Dr. Rautio, the representative of Finland, for her statement and the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Myanmar, Ambassador Hlaing.

Mr. HLAING (Myanmar): Mr. President, allow me, first of all, to offer you our warmest congratulations on behalf of my delegation as well as on my own on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for this month. Your vast experience and extensive expertise in the field of disarmament will go a long way in guiding the negotiations in the CD to a successful outcome. Australia has made considerable contributions in our negotiations on a CWC. Your assumption of the presidency during this crucial phase of negotiations will provide an added impetus to the early conclusion of a CWC. May I also express our deep appreciation to your predecessor Ambassador Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, for the skilful and effective manner in which he steered the work of the CD during the tenure of his presidency? My delegation would like to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency Dr. Edmundo Vargas, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Chile, who has honoured us to address the CD despite his manifold duties. His statement contained important points to which my delegation listened with great interest. May I take this opportunity to welcome to our midst Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan and Ambassador Sir Michael Weston of the United Kingdom, who have recently joined us in the CD? Ambassador Dr. Juraj Králik of Czechoslovakia and Ambassador Dr. Warnasena Rasaputram of Sri Lanka have just taken leave of us to assume other important responsibilities, and we wish them every success in their new endeavours. Our good wishes also go to Ambassador Dhanapala, who is leaving UNIDIR to rejoin the Sri Lankan Foreign Service. We wish him further success. My delegation also takes pleasure in conveying our warmest congratulations to Ambassador Berasategui on his recent appointment as the Secretary-General of the CD. Ambassador Berasategui is an epitome of the competence and continuity which have always characterized the work of the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

This year 1992 is a landmark year for chemical weapons. Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/35 C, we in the CD are currently concentrating our efforts on CW negotiations with a view to achieving a final agreement on CW convention before the end of this year. Accordingly, I should like to devote my statement today to chemical weapons. One cannot talk about the current negotiations on a CWC without recognizing the significant and substantial contribution made by Ambassador von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany to the work of tne Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in his capacity as its Chairman. His breadth of vision, his tireless efforts and his pragmatic approach to negotiations combined with his sense of humour have contributed to much progress in our negotiations. Our tribute also goes to other distinguished members of the bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee for their invaluable inputs in this crucial stage of negotiations on a CWC.

Progress being made in the CD towards the conclusion of a CWC is being followed with great interest and high expectations by the international community. Since the conclusion of the ENMOD Convention in 1977, the CD has not been able to produce a concrete multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreement through those 15 long years. The successful conclusion of a CWC at this juncture will give a great impetus to the role of

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

multilateralism in the field of disarmament in the post-cold-war era. The urgent need for a successful conclusion of a CWC cannot therefore be overemphasized. It must, however, be stressed that quality should not be sacrificed for the sake of speed, and that it is essential to produce a really good convention which will ensure universal adherence.

In this crucial final phase of CW negotiations in the past few weeks a great many delegations have taken an active part in the negotiations and a number of them have come forward with concrete proposals and alternative forumations which prove to be helpful in our movement forward. Among the concrete proposals placed on the table are the amendment proposals put forward by a group of 12 developing countries, including my own, contained in working papers CD/CW/WP.402 through 409. May I take this opportunity to reaffirm here that these amendment proposals from G.12 are intended to quicken the momentum of rapid progress towards the early conclusion of a CWC? These amendment proposals are offered in a genuinely constructive spirit; and are aimed at facilitating the successful and expeditious conclusion of such a CWC.

During the continuous and intensive negotiations on the basis of the amendment proposals by G.12 from 9 to 19 June several delegations made invaluable contributions. However, these negotiations have not been able so far to produce agreed texts in certain areas; and differences still remain in the positions of delegations on some key issues.

At the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on 22 June, the Chairman of the Committee Ambassador von Wagner presented a revised text of the draft convention (CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1). We owe our thanks to the Chairman of the Committee and members of his delegation for having done a difficult task in such a short time.

The ban on the use of chemical weapons has been only a partial one under the 1925 Geneva Protocol owing to the reservations made by a number of States parties. My delegation is gratified to note that the legal regime for banning the use of CW will be further strengthened to cover the whole gamut under the future CW convention by making its prohibition complete and without any exception under article I. We subscribe to the view that the future CW convention should not, however, preclude the legitimate non-hostile uses of herbicides and riot control agents which do not come under the definition of chemical weapons. We are happy to observe that this point of view will be reflected in the future CWC, following the agreement among the delegations on this issue.

The question of the composition of the executive council under article VIII is a matter of great importance and much interest to many delegations in the CD. My delegation has expressed its view on this matter in the Working Group. While recognizing the relevance of an industrial criterion, we feel that the time-honoured principle of equitable geographical distribution should form the main basis for the composition of the executive council. My delegation attaches immense importance to the principle of rotation among

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

States parties and has proposed that this principle be reflected as one of the guidelines for election to the executive council. We are happy to see the reflection of this principle in the latest working paper dated 18 June, prepared by the Friend of the Chair Ambassador Tóth.

Last but not least, we warmly applaud the Friend of the Chair on the question of the seat of the future organization, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, for the commendable manner in which he has accomplished an extremely delicate task. Our warm congratulations go to the Netherlands delegation whose country will now have the honour of playing host to the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons.

A comprehensive chemical weapons convention will certainly be one of the most significant multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament. Let us make it a realy good convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Myanmar for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor? I see Dr. Gaspar of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic.

Mr. GASPAR (Czechoslovakia): I would like to make a brief statement on behalf of the Group of East European and other States on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. We consider that the proportion of the votes given for the resoluton 46/38 B during the last General Assembly of the United Nations clearly reflected different views which still exist on this specific question.

We would like to underline that our previously stated understanding of the conclusion reached by the Ad Hoc Committee on the CPD in 1989 on resuming work "with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the near future, when circumstances are more conducive to making progress in this regard" remains unchanged. However, we do believe that the Conference on Disarmament itself is able to find various appropriate ways for transforming all positive international changes into a constructive process aimed at successful negotiations on multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements in the future.

Mr. FAROUQUE (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, my delegation is delighted to see you presiding over this important forum at a time it has to make decisive steps forward on issues of crucial importance to all of us. Sir, you come from a nation with whom Sri Lanka enjoys long-standing close ties and cooperation and bond of friendship. Particularly, being members of the Commonwealth and founder members of the Colombo Plan our two countries have always worked together for the promotion of peace and democracy through disarmament, economic development and technical cooperation. Your diplomatic skills and wide experience and commitment to the cause of disarmament are well known and we wish you every success in your endeavour.

(Mr. Farouque, Sri Lanka)

I also wish to take this opportunity to express our sincere gratitude to your predecessors Ambassador Semichi of Algeria and Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina for the exemplary and excellent manner in which they carried out their mandate with great acceptance by everybody.

My delegation is deeply touched by the kind words of appreciation showered on a fellow-countryman, Ambassador Dhanapala, by you, Sir, and other distinguished delegates. As a representative of Sri Lanka, I should be failing in my duties if I do not respond to your well-deserved tribute to Ambassador Dhanapala. On behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka, I wish to place on record our gratitude for those words of appreciation of the work done by Ambassador Dhanapala in his capacity as Director of UNIDIR.

When he was chosen for the post of Director of UNIDIR, Ambassador Dhanapala had already an illustrious career in the Foreign Service of Sri Lanka, to which he is now returning. He needs no introduction to this esteemed body. His close association with disarmament circles and activities has been very well known long before he became the Director of UNIDIR. Sri Lanka is proud that he held this post during a crucial period of time and carried out the responsibilities entrusted to him to the satisfaction of all. It is also heartening to know that he has been held in high esteem by all those whom came to know him for his personal qualities and outstanding professional abilities.

The research work done by UNIDIR under his stewardship has been substantial. It has inspired significant responses generating international cooperation and efforts, however modest they may be, in all disarmament issues. He has enriched and enhanced the image of UNIDIR.

Sir, you expressed your farewell appreciation on a sombre note. On the contrary, my delegation is happy to extend a warm welcome to this home-coming of Ambassador Dhanapala.

I am confident that his knowledge and experience will continue to be available to disarmament work. In the case of Ambassador Dhanapala, we can rest assured that there is no need for any more confidence-building measures to ensure his effective contribution which he can make from Sri Lanka.

In conclusion, my delegation is pleased to convey to the Government of Sri Lanka those words of appreciation addressed to Ambassador Dhanapala by the presidency and other distinguished delegates.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq.

Mr. HUSSEIN (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, my delegation would like at the outset to avail itself of this opportunity to express to you our congratulations on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Conference and to wish you every success in carrying out your noble task. Your experience and competence will undoubtedly ensure the success of the Conference's work at this crucial juncture.

My delegation would like to make a short statement concerning what was said by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran at this Conference. Unfortunately, an important part of his statement fell beyond the scope of the Conference's work. The representatives of Iran unfortunately are in the habit of making use of such conferences for purposes of propaganda, trying to belittle the intelligence of their members by giving false interpretations of events. The statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran actually represents an attempt by the Iranian regime to divert attention from its armament programmes and to cover up its intensive and large-scale armament activities by various means. We do not, in this connection, wish to raise the question of the secret arms deals with the United States and the countries which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Iranian regime mentioned, or the question of Israel's involvement in those deals. We shall merely refer to what the Secretary of State of the United States said to the New York Times on 8 December 1991, to the effect that the United States had rendered Israel a service by allowing it to sell weapons to Iran in 1981 and 1982.

The statement made by the Secretary of State of the United States exposed the attempted deception on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran when he spoke of the obstacles impeding accession by the Middle East countries to the chemical weapons convention. The problem of security in our region, to which the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs also referred, can be solved only by adopting uniform criteria, by creating confidence based on respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, by respecting the aspirations of the peoples of the region to self-determination, by renouncing the selective application of international law and by recognizing the need for all the countries of the region to participate in guaranteeing its security. The attempt to isolate some of the main protagonists in the Gulf is only part of a scheme which is being pursued by the United States in one way or another; a scheme which is well known to all countries, including Iran.

To bewail the credibility of the Security Council in regard to the implementation of its resolutions is inconsistent with the well-known past record of Iran, which refused to accept Security Council resolution 598 (1987). Iran is still obstructing the application of this resolution as an integrated and cohesive peace plan because the real policy of Iran is not a policy which seeks genuine peace based on justice and international law. This attitude is also inconsistent with Iran's violation of that resolution by refusing to return the Iraqi prisoners of war who have been held captive for more than 10 years in spite of the cessation of military operations on 20 August 1988 and in spite of Iran's involvement in the dispatch of subversive groups to

(Mr. Hussein, Iraq)

Iraq and the mob violence and political disturbances that it incited after the end of the military aggression in March 1991. Moreover, Iranian military aircraft carried out air raids on Iraqi territory on 5 April 1992.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, when he spoke of the credibility of the Security Council, should have referred to the fact that the Security Council did not take any measure to call Israel to account or punish it when it committed a blatant act of aggression in 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear reactor which was intended solely for peaceful purposes. At that time, the Security Council remained silent on the question of Israel's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes. He should also have referred to the double standards applied by the Council when it formulated a systematic policy for the destruction of Iraq's economic structure and weapons.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to remind the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the maxim that "persons living in glass houses should not throw stones at others".

Mr. RANJABAR (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, first of all, allow me to express my congratulations on your assumption as the President of the Conference on Disarmament at this crucial stage. What I want to say is just to advise the distinguished delegate of Iraq to refer to the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati. I would just like to mention that this statement is composed of three parts; first, nuclear disarmament, then chemical weapons disarmament and third, transparency in armaments. All those parts should be studied in a very compound basis. And the other point we should like to emphasize is the fact that Iraq invaded Iran. This is undeniable and has already been established by the United Nations Organization. This fact anyhow is beyond any argument. On the question of air attack on Iraqi territory which the distinguished representative of Iraq right now pointed out, I shall say that this question concerns the mujahidin who had invaded the Iran border several times. This terrorist group was supported by Iraq and now also this group is being supported by the Iraqi regime. It was just a short response to the invasion by the terrorist group of the cities of Iran.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I am reminded of the story of the father who sees his 10-year old son come home, obviously bruised and beaten, and he's been in a bit of a fight. The father decides to sit down and say to the boy, "Let's discuss this man to man. Tell me exactly what happened." And the boy says, "Well, Dad, it all started when the other fellow hit me back." The statements about the United States of America by the representative of the pariah regime in Baghdad, to use Brian Mulroney's words, are ludicrous and laughable.

The PRESIDENT: I hope that, as my predecessor commented last week, we can avoid as much as possible repeated statements on matters which are not directly related to the responsibilities of this negotiating body. In accordance with that principle, I shall consider the discussion ended at this stage and proceed to other business.

(The President)

The secretariat has circulated today the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the first week of the third party of the annual session. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. This might indeed prove to be the case, as new developments between now and then may require some adjustments or additional details. This could apply, for example, to our work on chemical weapons and also to the consideration of the draft annual report to the General Assembly. In connection with this question, the secretariat will circulate, during the recess, draft substantive paragraphs on agenda items 3, 7, 8 and 9, as well as the technical parts of the draft report. You will also notice that I have scheduled an informal meeting on the question of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. This is in implementation of the agreement reached at the very opening of the annual session to discuss this matter in that framework, in order to respond to the request made to the Conference by the General Assembly in its resolution 44/116 O. If there is no objection, I suggest that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As I announced at the outset of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of item 3 of the agenda, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

I have no further business, and unless any other delegation wishes to speak, I shall adjourn the plenary session. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 23 July, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.627
23 July 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 23 July 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Paul O'Sullivan (Australia)

GE.92-62404/4716B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 627th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I wish to recall that today, immediately following the plenary meeting, the Conference will hold its last informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In addition, as I announced at the informal meeting last Tuesday, we will take up those sections of the annual report which are still pending in informal open-ended consultations to be held in this conference room, with interpretation services.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mexico, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Republic of Korea. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marin Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, we congratulate you on the way you have been guiding the course of our work. Since your country joined this Conference, it has worked hard to help achieve the goals the international community set itself for disarmament in 1978, which are reflected in our agenda and work programme. This year Australia has continued that tradition, for which we are grateful to you, to the other members of your delegation and to your Government. Your task as President has been facilitated by your immediate predecessors. We welcome Ambassador Goonetilleke and offer our best wishes to him and to his predecessor Ambassador Rasaputram, and also to Ambassador Calovski and Ambassador Králik.

A few months ago we had occasion to take stock of the Conference's work on its thirtieth anniversary. The year 1992 is in fact one in which various important anniversaries are being celebrated. We hope that in the future it will also be remembered as the year in which we finally concluded the Convention on Chemical Weapons. We likewise cherish the hope that we shall be able to avoid its being remembered as the year in which this Conference came to an abrupt end.

In this statement the delegation of Mexico would like to take up two closely linked subjects: the negotiations on the elimination of chemical weapons and the future of the Conference itself. We are coming to the end of a very long road in our work on chemical weapons, and the question marks that this raises for the Conference on Disarmament are real ones and call for clear answers.

Since 1989, following the Paris and Canberra conferences, the international community has been stressing the need for a multilateral instrument on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. Today, three years later, the Conference on Disarmament can feel satisfied with the advances made in the last few years, regardless of the ups and downs in the negotiations in recent times.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

Nobody can deny the impetus that was given to the negotiations in May last year when the United States Government announced that it was willing to complete "the chemical weapons convention within the next 12 months" (CD/PV.591, 16 May 1991). However, it has to be remembered that just under a year earlier the bilateral agreement between the United States and the then Soviet Union had become an obstacle to the progress of multilateral negotiations. It was completely unacceptable for many countries that the main possessors of chemical weapons should reserve the right to keep 2 per cent of their stocks until all possible possessors of such weapons acceded to the Convention.

This year, in pursuance of United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/35C, the Conference on Disarmament decided to further mandate the Ad Hoc Committee "to intensify, as a priority task, the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction with the view to striving to achieve a final agreement on the convention by 1992".

Under the determined chairmanship of Ambassador von Wagner the Ad Hoc Committee has been given a series of electric shocks. To begin with, the work was organized in a new way: on the one hand, each specific question was subjected to more intensive consideration, and on the other, the membership of the Committee's bureau was significantly increased, thus enabling more delegations to participate in the direction of its work.

Shortly afterwards, Australia's initiative in submitting a draft Convention administered the strongest shock of all. This led us to realize that after years of negotiations, and regardless of the many square brackets and footnotes in the so-called "rolling text", there was a whole range of agreements and understandings which suggested that a prompt conclusion to the negotiations was in sight. Accordingly, the Chairman of the Committee was requested to prepare a document during the intersessional period which would serve as a basis for what was called a final negotiating stage.

Between 18 May and 22 June, the dates on which working paper CD/CW/WP.400 and CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 were submitted, the Ad Hoc Committee held meetings that were tantamount to forced marches. Delegations set about a painstaking study of the outstanding questions, and a group of delegations from developing countries submitted a series of formal proposals, with a view to arriving at compromise solutions which would meet the interests of the different groups of countries, and not just the members of one group in particular.

The text prepared by the Chairman of the Committee at the end of this period of intense negotiations, contained in working paper CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1, represents an important step forward on the way to the conclusion of the draft Convention which this Conference is to submit to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-seventh session.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The Mexican Government, like others, undertook a thorough study of the draft Convention during the intersessional period. It is worth noting here that since last February my country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has convened an interministerial group which, with the participation of representatives of the Mexican chemical industry, has considered the various questions relating to the possible application of the future Convention at the national level.

Mexico has always been greatly interested in the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. This is demonstrated both by its accession without reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and by the statement it made on signing the Convention on Biological Weapons in 1972.

We welcome the fact that there is at last general agreement on the need for a complete prohibition of chemical weapons, as embodied in working paper CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1. The Government of Mexico considers that with a minimum of adjustments and clarification of certain points, the Conference on Disarmament would be able to submit a consensus text for approval by the United Nations General Assembly this autumn. We are encouraged by Ambassador von Wagner's attitude when he tells us that his working paper is a text that is open to improvement.

To reach a consensus we shall have to consider the various changes proposed with all due care. For example, let us aim for greater precision in article II, entitled "Definitions and Criteria", since it will be a key element in future interpretations. We are concerned in particular with the definition of "Purposes not prohibited under this Convention". We consider that paragraph 9(d) should say, in English: "Domestic law enforcement and riot control purposes". (We are proposing this form of words in English because we realize that the greatest care will have to be taken with the translation.)

Although Mexico will not be affected by the obligation to destroy chemical weapons and their production facilities - since we have never possessed them - our Government considers that the provisions in question constitute the key to the multilateral security agreement we are negotiating. Any delay in complying with these provisions could be fraught with grave implications not just for the security of the States Parties, but for international peace and security.

Obviously we know the problems that could face some States which have chemical weapons. Nevertheless, we consider that the period for their destruction should be kept at 10 years and that only if in highly exceptional circumstances some State Party is unable to meet that deadline should a decision be taken on the subject by the Conference of States Parties. We are also unable to accept the idea that if a State is slow to destroy its stockpiles, other States with chemical weapons should not be obliged to abide by the deadline.

Accordingly, consideration should be given to a series of amendments to Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex. In particular the appropriate

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

modifications should be made so that any decision on the subject will be adopted by the Conference of States Parties. In addition, the last sentence of paragraph 21 should be deleted.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to be set up in accordance with article VIII will be the machinery through which the States Parties will seek "to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it".

As intergovernmental bodies, the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council will provide the framework for consultations and collaboration among States Parties. Although both these bodies ought to have machinery for taking decisions with all due dispatch, the Executive Council, in view of the important powers and functions assigned to it, must be in a position to take decisions quickly. It therefore seems odd to the Mexican Government that a two-thirds majority of all members should be required in order to decide whether a question is or is not a matter of substance. In other multilateral forums and agencies, such decisions are taken by a simple majority. For that reason, the last sentence of paragraph 29 of article VIII should be deleted, and it should be left to the Preparatory Commission to formulate this provision in the draft rules of procedure of the Executive Council to be approved by the Conference of States Parties.

Finally, article XI is of particular importance for Mexico, as for other developing countries. We hope that the entry into force of the Convention will lead to controls on exports to States Parties being lifted and not legitimized. In order to avoid future problems of interpretation, the references to possible inconsistencies with the object and purpose of the Convention in paragraph 2 (c), (d) and (e) should be deleted.

Like many others, we should like to amend working paper CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 still further. However, we are convinced that we ought to take advantage of the present opportunity in the Conference and conclude a Convention as soon as possible. We cherish the hope that all countries - including those that have already indicated their acceptance of the present contents of working paper CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 - will seriously consider the amendments proposed over the next few days. It is obvious that the way in which part of the text of document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 was "negotiated" has led to some confusion. Various delegations have said that they have already made all the concessions they can and that the document will therefore have to be accepted as it stands. These delegations have some reason on their side, but they are forgetting that these "concessions" were only made in relation to a certain number of delegations and not to all the other members of the Conference. The future Convention should be for everyone, and everyone should be in a position to endorse its contents before it goes to the General Assembly.

The conclusion of a Convention that will be universally accepted has been one of the aims of this Conference. Now, by trying too hard to end up with a particular text which has the support of many but not all, we are running the risk that the future Convention will not win this universal acceptance.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

We are thus concerned to hear some delegates say that none of the multilateral instruments that have emerged from this Conference has been the subject of a consensus among its members but that they have nevertheless gone to the General Assembly, which has endorsed them. It will be remembered that this Conference has produced five instruments: the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty, the 1970 seabed Treaty, the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons and the 1976 ENMOD Convention. The first, that is, the partial test-ban Treaty, was negotiated trilaterally in Moscow, and then slightly "improved" by the then ENDC. The second and third were negotiated here in Geneva on the basis of identical texts submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively and "improved" a little under pressure from the General Assembly. So far the ENDC. Then, in the CCD, it was decided to separate biological weapons from chemical ones, and a Convention was concluded on the basis of identical drafts submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1976, once again, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted identical drafts, which became the ENMOD Convention. In the case of this last instrument and the NPT there was no consensus. In the other three cases, there was. The ENDC and the CCD were co-chaired by the representatives of the then two super-Powers, and, consequently, when they reached agreement, that agreement was "accepted" by all or practically all the other members, beginning with their military allies.

It was precisely in order to avoid a repetition of this kind of situation and to secure the participation of China, France and other countries that it was decided to establish a more democratic forum in the Conference on Disarmament, which would not have co-presidents but would have a consensus rule.

Everyone knows our view on consensus. We never insisted that it should apply in the Conference. But others did, and this is the rule that has prevailed for 14 years, and the rule that has been invoked by one delegation or another to avoid the establishment of committees on various subjects or to make sure that they are not negotiated on. It would seem, however, that respect for the consensus rule has been eroded. I only hope we are wrong.

Those are my Government's comments on the status of the negotiations on chemical weapons.

We should now like to turn briefly to the question of what will happen in the Conference on Disarmament once the Convention is concluded. In other words, will there be any life in the Conference after chemical weapons? The answer to this question - which many of us have been trying to answer for some years - holds the key to the Conference's future.

It is understandable that in a last intense collective effort the members of the Conference should have concentrated primarily, in some cases exclusively, on the negotiations on chemical weapons. In doing so, however, they have left aside some of the questions on our agenda, beginning with nuclear disarmament, and more particularly the complete cessation of nuclear

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

tests. In point of fact, this year's report by the Conference to the General Assembly, apart from the chapter on chemical weapons, will be more discouraging than in previous years. On none of the other seven items has there been any progress, and in some cases it could even be said that ground has been lost. To put it another way, while prompt conclusion of the Convention on Chemical Weapons will undoubtedly be clear evidence of the Conference's robust state of health, the situation with regard to the other items on our agenda points towards a highly pessimistic diagnosis. The bells that will no doubt ring out when the Convention on chemical weapons is concluded could end up sending another signal. They could be sounding the death-knell of the Conference itself.

What can we do about this situation, which can only get worse in 1993, when we shall be sitting round this table with an agenda that no longer includes chemical weapons? Various suggestions have been put forward, some innovative, some less so. For some delegations, what needs to be done is to shut down this Conference as fast as possible. Those delegates who have become experts on chemical weapons may choose to move to The Hague. Others will go off to other cities, to other business.

For other delegations, including mine, the Conference ought to go on disposing of its agenda, redoubling its efforts, especially on nuclear subjects. It has also been suggested that we should find other subjects and add them to our agenda. My delegation made a proposal along those lines and has had informal consultations on it. And my delegation also proposed that periodically the current President or the Secretary-General of the Conference should convene heads of delegations to discuss, without documents, without records and without interpreters, those questions considered to be of general interest. There is no need to say that the future of our work and the fate of the Conference itself represent the core of those "questions of general interest".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I wish to note at this stage the presence among us of the new representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Bernard Gonnetilleke, who is assuming his responsabilities as representative to this Conference. In extending to him a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf and on behalf of the Australian delegation, I should like to assure him of the close cooperation of my own delegation and all Members here and we will be most ready to assist him in the performance of his functions. You are most welcome.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, in June, I already had the opportunit to congratulate you on your assumption of the leadership of this body and to praise the achievements of your predecessor, Ambassador García Moritán. I would, however, like to join you in greeting and expressing welcome to our new Sri Lankan colleague, Ambassador Gonnetilleke.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

Long ago, in a far different international environment than prevails today, this Conference began work on a convention to eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the earth. The effort has been uneven and - most of us would agree - far too slow, despite the guidance of dedicated and gifted ad hoc committee chairmen and the hard work of delegations. We all have our own views on the reasons for the CW Convention's long gestation period. That is not the question, however, today. Now, under the leadership of our distinguished colleague Ambassador von Wagner of Germany, we have an excellent chance of finishing this work and opening the CW Convention for signature by the entire community of nations. This will be the first great achievement of this unique multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiating body.

Some time during the next two weeks, each participant and observer in our Conference must decide whether it can accept the Chairman's draft final text.

Let me say, on behalf of the United States of America, that our answer to this question is "yes".

We can accept the draft Convention text contained in document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 in its entirety. Our decision was not reached easily. In many important respects United States preferred positions have been substantially watered down or are completely absent. For example, the text before us does not allow a State that is attacked with CW to retaliate with chemical weapons even though it still has stockpiles available, nor can a State retain a small security CW stockpile until all CW-capable States have joined the treaty. Furthermore, the text does not provide for automatic initiation of a challenge inspection whenever a request is made, nor is the presence of observers from the requesting State assured. The text does not reflect the United States position that there should be limits on the number of challenge inspections a State must receive each year, that trade restrictions should be applied against non-parties, and that the responsibility for destruction of any chemical weapons whatever on a State's territory should rest entirely on that State.

I could go on and on with a long list of specific areas where the text does not reflect our preferred positions. In some of these cases the United States has made concessions to facilitate progress. In fact, we have made a whole series of concessions over the last several years. In other cases the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador von Wagner, has proposed a different approach to resolve a controversial issue where positions had not been reconciled after long debate.

The fact is that the text before the Ad Hoc Committee reflects a fragile and painfully achieved balance among many different positions and many different issues. While we would prefer different provisions in many areas of the text, we have decided after close study that a certain sacrifice on our part is necessary to achieve broad-based agreement, and that the remaining balance adequately protects our security interests.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The Ad Hoc Committee has debated the controversial issues at length. I doubt that going through any of them again will result in a better array of compromises. On the contrary, opening up a controversial issue could well disrupt the fragile balance of interests and positions as States again try to tilt the balance in their direction. If this happens, I can promise you that the United States will put forward its own preferred positions on several critical issues. But I am also aware that renewed debate on controversial issues could mean failure to finish the Convention this year.

However, the United States does not rule out further changes to the text. We are prepared to consider seriously proposals from delegations on points they consider fundamental to their interests. But we fully endorse Ambassador von Wagner's position that changes to the draft can only be made by consensus. We know of no other way to achieve a text that all delegations can support.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, at the outset, let me congratulate you on Australia's assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the current month. It is particularly fitting that a country which has contributed so much to the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention should be in the Chair of the Conference at such a crucial stage in these negotiations. Today, however, it is not about these negotiations that I wish to speak. Rather, it is about cooperation in another field between the United Kingdom and another member of the Commonwealth, not one of the eight of us including Sri Lanka, whose new representative I join you in welcoming most warmly, who are members of the Conference on Disarmament.

I am pleased to announce that, as part of a wider programme of cooperation on seismological research, the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Swaziland have agreed to become working partners in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. This partnership will begin at the next session of the Ad Hoc Group from 27 July to 7 August, when we will table a joint paper analysing seismograms recorded from 1973-1976 during the operation of a temporary seismic station in the Kingdom of Swaziland.

This agreement coincides with an offer of practical assistance from the United Kingdom with the establishment of a seismic station in the Kingdom of Swaziland. The United Kingdom looks forward to close cooperation on seismological research with the Kingdom of Swaziland, and believes the establishment of a seismic station in the Kingdom of Swaziland will make a valuable contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Group by developing the network of seismic stations in the Southern Hemisphere.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): Mr. President, before turning to the main topic of my statement, I should like to extend to you the warm congratulations of my delegation and myself, on your assumption of the Presidency of this Conference. Although our two countries are very far apart in a geographical sense, they are close in their views on many issues, including the questions on disarmament. We have enjoyed an excellent cooperation over the years and you, yourself, Mr. President, have played a prominent role in this context. I am sure that your experience and professional skill will prove to be great assets for the CD at this crucial stage of its work. May I also take this opportunity to express our great appreciation for the highly professional manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador García Moritán, discharged his duties as President of this Conference. I welcome very warmly the new representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Gonnetilleke, in our midst. We look forward very much to cooperating with him and I should also like to extend our good wishes to his predecessor, Ambassador Rasaputram, for his future activities.

The Conference on Disarmament is now embarking on the third and last part of its 1992 session. The coming weeks may prove to be decisive for the Conference in many respects, depending on whether we will be able to conclude the negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention in a successful manner. Such a Convention will be a major achievement for the multilateral efforts in the area of arms limitation and disarmament. It will strengthen international peace and security, and it will demonstrate the feasibility of the multilateral negotiating approach in this vital field of international relations. A failure, in its turn, would be extremely harmful both to the security situation and to the multilateral efforts in this area. Other, less comprehensive and cooperative, approaches will probably then be pursued in order to deal with some of the threats which face the international community and which have to be addressed as a matter of urgency. This goes both for chemical weapons and for other pressing issues which are, or should be, inscribed on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

Unilateral and partial solutions to problems of a global nature would not be in the interest of anyone, and especially not the smaller and weaker members of the international community. It is of vital importance to stand up for the multilateral, cooperative approach and to help it succeed by being constructive.

Whatever the outcome of the decisive efforts which will be undertaken in the next few weeks, it will be necessary to take a fresh look at the agenda and programme of work of the Conference, its membership and other related issues. The agenda of the CD and its methods of work are at least partly a child of the cold-war era and predicated on the, in that situation, rather remarkable consensus achieved at the first special session on disarmament in

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

1978. We are now facing a radically different, but not necessarily less complicated, international situation, and this calls for new thinking and new initiatives.

It is high time that we start an exchange of views on these matters so that the Conference can embark on a new start in the coming year. My statement today is intended to contribute to such an exchange.

There seems to be a widespread and growing feeling in the Conference that the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention have now reached a stage where they have become a question of now or never. After so many years of concerted efforts and painstaking negotiations there is little or nothing that can realistically be done in order to advance the negotiations further. The issues are well defined and the positions well known. The Chairman's text (CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1) represents an honest and reasonable compromise product, and Ambassador von Wagner and his delegation deserve great appreciation for their work. However, document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 goes very far in meeting the demands of those who do not wish to see an intrusive verification regime. This is a source of grave concern to my delegation, because it means that the effectiveness of the proposed verification regime has diminished, and thereby the trust that a State Party may have in the compliance of all other States Parties with the provisions of the Convention. It has always puzzled my delegation that certain countries seem to regard themselves as being always either on the defensive, and subject to verification, or on the offensive, in the form of a challenging State. If we want to have a balanced system, we must face ourselves in both roles.

Sweden for its part has never subscribed either to the slogan of "anytime-anywhere" or to the more recently emerging tendency of "hardly anytime or anywhere". It is obvious that all States Parties have a strong interest in being able to have trust in the effectiveness of the verification of compliance of all Parties with the provisions of the Convention. Furthermore, it is obvious that most, if not all, countries have military or industrial secrets which are unrelated to the forthcoming CW Convention and which they have a legitimate right to protect. It should also be obvious that the inspectors cannot be regarded as potential spies in the secret service of any other State Party. They will be international civil servants operating under defined mandates and under the authority of the Organization. Further attempts to weaken the inspection and other verification arrangements are therefore neither advisable nor acceptable.

A success in the chemical weapons negotiations will set the stage for a new era in the history of multilateral negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. It would also provide a positive and much needed impetus for the efforts to seek solutions at the negotiating table to problems which face the entire international community. Such an approach is, in the view of my country, much preferable to unilateral measures and partial solutions. This is in fact true for all global issues, and not least for those which relate to international peace and security.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

In spite of several serious shortcomings in the text, Sweden is, in the spirit of compromise and in the interest of promoting consensus and universal adherence, prepared to accept document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1, provided it is not changed in a manner that would further undermine the verification regime.

The Conference on Disarmament has been established to respond to the need for a truly multilateral negotiating forum. If it did not exist, it would immediately be invented. But as it does exist, it must also live up to reasonable expectations of the international community, otherwise its existence may even be called into question.

It has been said that the dialogue on topical security issues which has been going on continuously in the CD over the years, in spite of the ups and downs in the super-Power relationship and the international situation, has a value in itself. This is certainly true, but this fact alone is hardly enough to justify the existence of the Conference. It is therefore of vital importance that the Conference adapt itself to the radical political changes which have taken place in the last few years and the new threats and possibilities which are emerging in this new situation. The CD should also endeavour to contribute to changing the international situation by new initiatives and concrete agreements that will help relax tensions and lead to a safer world. It is true that disarmament may come about as a result of the relaxation of tensions, but it is also true that arms races in themselves contribute to creating tensions and a worsening of the international climate, and that the limitation and reduction of armaments can have the opposite effects. The Conference should thus not just wait for the international situation to improve, it should also contribute to such a change.

One of the first requirements for the relevance and effective functioning of the Conference is that its agenda should be topical and that there should be a preparedness on the part of all the members of the Conference to deal with the issues in a pragmatic and serious manner. We have seen too much of procedural wrangling over the years. It sounds like a truism to say that a negotiating forum should negotiate. However, as we all know, this is not evident as far as the CD is concerned. This is not only, or even primarily, a question of the formulation of mandates. In practice, it is often difficult to judge where in an incremental process towards an agreement the negotiation phase actually starts. In view of this, the formulation of mandates takes a disproportionate amount of our time and attention. Experience shows that once a negotiating process has started, nobody pays any attention to the formulation of the mandate in question. If there is a will to negotiate and reach agreement on an issue, progress will be achieved, if no such will is at hand there will be no progress, irrespective of the formulation of the mandate. It would, therefore, be a step forward if there were in the future to be less insistence on the particular formulation of mandates for ad hoc committees.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

It would also be a step forward if the rule of consensus were to be applied in a more reasonable manner. It is, for example, not reasonable to use the rule of consensus to prevent the Conference from dealing with issues which the overwhelming majority of States in the international community wish to be addressed in a serious and constructive manner by the Conference on Disarmament.

A look at our traditional agenda illustrates how urgent it is for the CD to adjust itself to the new situation. From experience, gained during several years, we now know that some agenda items, at least in their present form, are less likely to receive adequate consideration in this Conference. Some have in fact been dealt with, but, regrettably, only minor results have so far been achieved within the framework of formal negotiating mandates.

In the view of my delegation, the agenda should be restructured in order to enable the Conference on Disarmament to work more effectively. We should identify issues of high political topicality and, perhaps, on some items, move from a general approach to more specific considerations.

Over the years, a nuclear test ban has had the first priority among the nuclear issues, at least on a more general political level. The ultimate goal seems to be shared by all States, but differences of opinion remain on the urgency of this matter.

The overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations has repeatedly called on the Conference on Disarmament to substantively consider a comprehensive test ban. Last autumn, this world-wide opinion was clearly demonstrated by the massive support for the merged resolution on this issue (resolution 46/29) at the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly. Against this background it is obvious that the question of a nuclear test ban remains highly topical and that it should continue to be allocated a separate item on the agenda of the CD.

The structure of the agenda should not be rigid. If the Confernce should deem it necessary, it should be possible to deal with several subjects under the same agenda item, but in separate formats.

Let me give some examples.

Agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", served originally as focal points for a series of nuclear issues. But so far, there has been no systematic consideration of specific aspects. At best, the Conference has agreed to hold informal plenary meetings, where general positions have been stated and participation has declined.

In the absence of a consensus to re-establish an ad hoc committee to deal with the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament it would, in our view, be preferable to deal with some elements envisaged in the Programme separately, without necessarily relating them to the overall concept.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

It might prove useful to merge these three agenda items, together with others, into one, maybe with the title "Other nuclear issues and new types of weapons of mass destruction". Under such an agenda item, issues at present pertaining to agenda items 2 and 3, as well as items 6-8, could be taken up. The Conference would then have an opportunity to decide periodically what specific issues it would be most useful to address at a given time. This could include, inter alia, issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as negative security assurances, a matter which may assume increased importance in the coming years. Such an agenda item could also make room for consideration of the question of so-called "traditional" radiological weapons ("track A").

It may seem drastic to regroup, in one single stroke, more than half of the existing agenda items into only one. But an overall item for these issues would serve both to keep them on the agenda and to permit a more flexible way to deal with specific issues within the general framework.

Non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction should be dealt with under a separate agenda item. For the time being the Conference on Disarmament is, as far as such weapons are concerned, concentrating its attention on the on-going negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention. However, there are also other issues that may soon come up in the framework of this item. The Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention contains important steps towards an improved regime on biological weapons, and the first meeting of Governmental Experts here in Geneva took us further along the road towards a verification regime for the Convention. It is too early to predict the outcome of the work of the experts, but it should be kept in mind that it might provide a basis for negotiating a verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention. If so, a formula should be found for dealing with this matter in the CD under the agenda item I have just referred to.

Regarding the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, limited aspects could be dealt with in a more concrete and specified manner. For the time being it seems most realistic to focus on confidence-building measures, including a code of conduct in outer space.

My delegation is aware that some delegations do not consider confidence-building measures to be a suitable topic for a disarmament forum, but it does not share this view. Experience from the CSCE process has clearly demonstrated the importance of confidence-building measures in the perspective of disarmament and arms limitation in the regional context. This is an issue which could be fruitfully pursued also within the global framework of this Conference.

Sweden's strong commitment to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities is well known. The radio-active fall-out from the Chernobyl accident demonstrated the devastating effects which could be expected as a result of a conventional attack on a nuclear facility.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

My delegation hopes that the time will soon come for a long-awaited break-through in the negotiations on a prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. This issue should form a separate agenda item, whereas radiological weapons in a more limited sense ("track A") could, as I previously mentioned, be dealt with under a new agenda item called "Other nuclear issues and new weapons of mass destruction".

The agenda item entitled "Transparency in armaments" should encompass conventional weapons as a first sub-item. Significant progress has been made in the last few years in the field of nuclear disarmament. It is now time to address in depth also the problems of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms. Resolution 46/36 L of the United Nations General Assembly provides an important basis for such work.

The way in which the CD discharges its duties in this matter will have consequences for the credibility of and confidence in the Conference as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. In the view of my delegation, the question would require the establishment of an ad hoc committee for its proper consideration.

As you may be aware, Mr. President, Sweden has proposed that the United Nations Disarmament Commission elaborate general guidelines on non-proliferation. It seems to my delegation that such guidelines would be useful for the work of the Conference on Disarmament as the problem of proliferation is likely to dominate security concerns in the coming decade and should therefore also have its proper place in the agenda of the CD.

The Conference, like its predecessors, was set up as a multilateral forum to be representative of the international community. Thus, the composition of the Conference has been revised several times in order to properly reflect new political realities. Now, once again the Conference has come to the crossroads where we need to re-examine the composition of the CD.

The present state of affairs, when a number of interested and well-qualified States are kept waiting for a decision on the membership issue, in some cases for more than 10 years, is simply not acceptable. This issue must now be seriously addressed and resolved.

In March 1991, Sweden, as President of the Conference, renewed efforts to resolve the pending issue of selecting new members of the Conference. Our efforts received strong support from individual delegations in the private consultations which were conducted on that occasion, but it became obvious that the time was not yet ripe for taking a decision as some delegations wanted to consider the matter further.

In view of the developments in international affairs which have taken place since then it seems that the time has come to seek a new approach.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

As we all know, the CD has not for many years produced any new treaty in spite of its balanced composition and limited membership. The arguments for the virtues of balanced composition and limited size should therefore be taken with a grain of salt.

The world is changing and the issues are becoming more multifaceted. We must now get rid of restricted formulas that are designed to maintain a political balance that has become obsolete.

The old groupings seem to be about to dissolve. In the future the pattern of cooperation will probably be shifting depending on the issues. It is thus questionable whether it is meaningful to try to construct a new "equilibrium" in the Conference.

When it comes to the question of size, it is pertinent to note that the wide participation in the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention has not been an obstacle. On the contrary, it has been an asset in the negotiations and should also enhance the chances of universal accession to the Convention.

Against this background it seems to be worth considering if the Conference on Disarmament should not be made open to all States which apply for membership, without discrimination. The number of participants would certainly increase, but there are reasons to believe that the increase would be rather modest.

The working methods of the CD should also be reconsidered. These methods are a remnant from an era characterized by East-West contention. We need new dynamic forms for consultations which do not stalemate positions. The end of the Cold War, as well as changes in the traditional groups and emerging new patterns of cooperation, call for a review of the present group system in the Conference. A development towards a new polarization in a North-South perspective would be highly deplorable and must be avoided.

Against the background of this reasoning, my delegation proposes that informal consultations start as soon as possible under the guidance of the President or the Secretary-General in order to elaborate proposals for an up-date and restructuring of the agenda of the Conference, for a reform of its working methods and for an expansion of its membership.

While it is necessary to address the questions of the agenda and the membership of the CD and its working methods, we must not permit the deliberations pertaining to these issues to hamper on-going substantive work and negotiations.

It is imperative to take our historic chance of concluding the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention within the next few weeks. Looking further ahead, the recent momentous changes in world politics suggest that the prospects have improved for progress on a number of other issues.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

We must take effective measures to fully utilize the inherent negotiating potentials of the Conference on Disarmament. As always, it is the security needs that bring about genuine work and real negotiations. The Conference should therefore concentrate on subjects having real prospects of effective negotiations and results.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Park.

Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea): As this is my first intervention since your assumption of the presidency, let me begin by expressing my pleasure in seeing you preside over this important forum at a time when it enters a very crucial phase. During your term in office, I hope you will bring us to the end of our long negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The Australian contribution to the CWC negotiations has justifiably been a subject of repeated commendation. As a President from a delegation with such a well-known reputation, I believe you will have a special sense of achievement as you see, under your presidency, the near completion of the Convention, a significant milestone in the history of the Conference on Disarmament. It is also in this context that my delegation as an observer State, has decided to make an intervention at this point.

The current revised text of the draft CWC (CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1) is the outcome of tough negotiations, particularly in recent months. For this, I should say that we owe our deep gratitude to Ambassador von Wagner of Germany, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and his delegation, as well as moderators of the negotiating groups and many other delegations. Their devotion, creative ideas, and spirit of compromise made the draft text possible.

The Government of the Republic of Korea has reviewed the draft text carefully, and reached the conclusion that the present text is acceptable to us. While we believe that there may be room for improvement, our endorsement of the present text is based upon our observation that it represents the best possible compromise. Also, my delegation has no objection to efforts to improve that text by consensus.

It is our considered view that the current text, on many controversial points, has delicately harmonized different positions, and therefore any attempt to make major changes would, I am afraid, result in disrupting subtle balance, and would prevent us from completing our work this year. What makes us more apprehensive is that further changes might cause us to lose our momentum, and result in the decades-long negotiation dragging on without concrete prospects.

A fully satisfactory convention cannot be a realistic aim in this world of diverse national interests. The important thing is whether the draft

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

reflects a reasonable degree of mutual concessions and balanced interests of all the members of the international community. Furthermore, it could be noted that some important parts of the Convention, such as industrial verification, are subject to re-examination after a certain period of time. We can better amend the text after a period of implementation.

Taking this opportunity, my delegation wishes to express the Republic of Korea's desire to play an active role in the implementation of the future Convention, as Korea has a major chemical industry. It is with this point in mind that my delegation attaches immense importance to the composition of the Executive Council. We are of the firm view that the purposes of the Convention will be best served when the Executive Council members from each geographical group, particularly those from the chemical industry, are chosen on the basis of objective criteria that assure maximum international acceptability and interregional consistency.

The Republic of Korea sincerely hopes that the future Convention will be universal. To be precise, we are happy to see all of our neighbouring countries joining the CWC, so that the East Asian region as a whole will put its strength together to eliminate one important category of weapons of mass destruction from the globe, and to verify compliance with various verification regimes including challenge inspections, thus reminding all the people in our region of the coming of the age of mutual confidence and better security.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes the list of speakers that I have for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

As usual, the Secretariat has distributed today the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. The timetable is only indicative and may be changed, if necessary. Indeed, we might need to do so, as we proceed with our consideration of the various sections of the draft report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. We have already advanced our work this week and I want to say that I am grateful for the assistance that I have received from all of you during our discussions last Tuesday. But there is still work to be done. This applies also to the subsidiary bodies, whose reports need to be adopted as soon as possible, with the exception of course of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It is so decided.

I give the floor to Ambassador von Wagner.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany): Just on a point of order, the slots reserved for the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in this timetable we have just adopted on Monday, Wednesday and Friday of next week are without prejudice to the format in which these slots will be used. I just want to make sure that delegations understand that we shall decide probably this Friday in which format we shall use these slots which are simply reserved for the Ad Hoc Committee as such.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador von Wagner for his clarification and his information. Are there any other observations? I see none.

As announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold the last informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2 immediately after the plenary. We shall later proceed to informal open-ended consultations, in this room and with interpretation services, to consider the draft annual report to the General Assembly.

May I also remind you that the Conference will hold an informal meeting, this afternoon at 3 p.m., on the request addressed to us by the General Assembly in its resolution 44/116 "O". In that connection, I wish to recall that we have agreed that non-members invited to participate in our work are also invited to participate in the informal meeting.

I have no other business and I shall now proceed to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 30 July, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.628
30 July 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIXTH HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 July 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Paul O'Sullivan (Australia)

GE.92-62492/4750B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 628th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset I would like to extend a very warm welcome to the new representative of Poland, Ambassador Dembinski, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf and on behalf of the Australian delegation. Professor Dembinski is attending our plenary meeting for the first time. He has had an outstanding academic background as a professor of the Graduate Institute of International Studies here in Geneva, where he was responsible for the diplomatic studies programme. In fact, I understand that some of his former students have been associated with the work of our Conference. I wish to assure Ambassador Dembinski of the close cooperation of my delegation and, I am sure, of all delegations in the performance of its work. You are most welcome.

I also wish to inform you that immediately after this plenary meeting we will hold an open-ended consultation on the draft report to the General Assembly. I hope that will be a brief meeting, followed by a meeting chaired by the Special Coordinator for agenda item 9, "Transparency in armaments", Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, to consider the section of the annual report dealing with that item.

I have on my list of speakers, today first of all the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, to present the report of that Committee, followed by the representatives of Italy, Argentina, Viet Nam, Netherlands, Bulgaria and Cuba. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Batsanov of the Russian Federation, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee contained in document CD/1159.

Mr. BATSANOV (Russian Federation): I have the honour today to present the report from the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons on its work during the 1992 session, before you now bearing the document symbol CD/1159. The report is a straightforward description of how the Ad Hoc Committee organized its work this session and does not enter into substantive discussion of the issues that fall in its purview. Instead, as has been done in the past, the report attaches the draft treaty text of the convention banning radiological weapons and the possible elements of a convention prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities. These two treaty texts were reviewed this session - in fact, during the first two parts of this session - under the able guidance of Mr. Dimitrijevic of Yugoslavia and Mr. Ausman of Canada. The Ad Hoc Committee owes them both a debt of gratitude and I wish to thank them for their efforts.

The work of the Ad Hoc Committee, as is the case for other committees, did not receive as much attention as would have been desired this year, owing to the increased workload placed on delegations participating in the chemical weapons negotiations. However, at the same time it must be noted that little progress has been able to be registered in both tracks over several years

(Mr. Batsanov, Russian Federation)

now. The draft convention prohibiting radiological weapons is at an advanced stage and was even improved slightly at this session, but the basic provision governing the scope and definition of biological weapons remains unresolved. The possible elements for a convention banning attacks against nuclear facilities saw only a slight modification in the text this session, but again the fundamental question of what facilities would fall under the protection of the convention remains open.

It is in this light that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee suggested that there be a change in the standard recommendation for the Ad Hoc Committee to be re-established in 1993. My suggestion, however, was modified into the form that is before you in the report. The Ad Hoc Committee recommends that the Conference re-establish it at the beginning of 1993, but, in a new development, the Ad Hoc Committee also recommends that the Conference give guidance to it in reviewing its organization of work with the aim of fulfilling the mandate that it will be given next year. It is in the wisdom of the Conference to seek the ways to give the Ad Hoc Committee the guidance that all delegations seem to feel the Committee needs in order to overcome the log-jam that is holding up progress. Needless to say that my own view is that this item should be reviewed in the overall review that the Conference might be willing to undertake to improve its effectiveness. With that I shall conclude my remarks on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons and commend it to the Conference.

(continued in Russian)

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to say literally two words as Russian representative since I am taking the floor for the first time during your presidency. I would like wholeheartedly to welcome you to this post at this exceptionally important and crucial time in the work of our Conference. That is, of course, above all with the phase in which the negotiations on chemical weapons now find themselves. We all know the contribution that has been made by Australia, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, by yourself as Australian representative to these negotiations and we expect that under your guidance at this time the Conference will successfully discharge the tasks that await it during the period of your presidency.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the chair. If I may, I should also like to congratulate him on the early conclusion of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. I intend to put the report just introduced by the Chairman before the Conference for adoption at our next plenary session on Thursday, 6 August. At the same time I hope that the two other subsidiary bodies still considering their reports would be able to adopt them soon.

I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso.

Mr. NEGROTTO CAMBIASO (Italy): Mr. President, I wish at the outset to express on behalf of my delegation the most sincere congratulations to you for your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in the current crucial phase of its history. It is a significant circumstance that you, the distinguished representative of Australia, a country which has devoted so much energy to the achievements of this Conference, are called at this moment to preside over our activities. I am confident that under your capable guidance this body will be able to attain the goals that are finally in its reach and create the premises for its future role in an evolving international environment.

I would like to seize this opportunity to welcome all the new permanent representatives and colleagues who have joined us since I last took the floor in the CD Plenary, as well as to wish all the best to those distinguished colleagues and friends who have left the CD in the meantime.

Never before has the Conference on Disarmament been so close to the achievement of one of the main purposes for which it was created, the possibility, now within reach, to conclude swiftly our collective efforts for the completion of a draft multilateral treaty aiming at a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Such an opportunity, pursued intensively by all of us for so many years, should not be wasted. Too much is at stake. Let me therefore pay first of all a special tribute of gratitude for the untiring efforts and resolve displayed by Ambassador von Wagner of Germany and by his delegation and Government in the fulfilment of the mandate that the CD itself, with an unprecedented degree of cohesion and determination, entrusted to them in March this year. The fruit of such efforts has been recently presented to us and is now in the form of a draft text of a Convention, in working document WP.400/Rev.1.

My delegation welcomes such a text. It contains, on the whole, provisions agreed by consensus. We do not regard it as the result of personal and biased considerations, but rather as a proposal of true compromise, based on an intensive and prolonged collective search for common ground - even within Groups themselves - between sometimes very different and apparently irreconcilable positions and perceptions on crucial issues.

WP.400/Rev.1 is not perfect. Like others, the Italian delegation does not consider the draft to reflect sufficiently a number of aspects not necessarily related to specific national interests with regard to disarmament, but which we believe would better promote the future itself of the Organization. I will refrain from enumerating them at this stage of the negotiations. They could be traced back to one basic consideration underlying our share of expectations not entirely met by WP.400/Rev.1. I refer to the degree of supranationality which constitutes in our view the most innovative feature of the Convention.

On challenge inspections, for instance, we would have preferred a greater role and more discretionality for the inspection team, who will represent on the ground the international community, in what is the most delicate and

(Mr. Negrotto Cambiaso, Italy)

concrete task entrusted to the Organization. Negotiations on article IX drifted progressively away from the initial, perhaps too idealistic concepts of intrusiveness and deterrence, considered by many indispensable to foster confidence in States parties' security perceptions. In our opinion, too many protections in favour of the inspected State party have found their way into the text.

We would have preferred shorter time-frames prior to access to the inspected site, more stringent provisions on securing the site, less subordination of "managed access" procedures to the sole consent and approval of the inspected State. Greater reflection could have been given to the precious experience acquired from national trial challenge inspections, which led for instance to the identification of the so-called "random selective access" techniques.

For the sake of protecting the credibility of the basic mechanisms of such an extreme but fundamental instrument of verification, we were prepared to pay a certain price in terms of accepting some limitations on the number of challenge inspections to be carried out within a given time, so as to reassure States parties from excessive and unjustified targeting. This "trade-off", however, did not gather sufficient support.

Italy believes it is the fundamental right of all those undertaking the cumbersome obligations of the ban - including, inter alia, financial commitments - to be able to rely upon an immediate process of verification of any doubt of compliance. Confidence and transparency are in fact at the very heart of any security and disarmament agreement. We in Europe have accepted automatic and most intrusive inspections on our territories in the framework of other disarmament treaties, and we do not regret it. All the more so, when an international organization, neutral and "super partes", is created for that purpose. This is why, for instance, the initial involvement of the Executive Council at the beginning of a challenge inspection, as foreseen in the draft Convention, represents, in the view of my delegation, a limit beyond which not only the fundamental right of signatories to the verification of compliance could be jeopardized, but the very capacity of the Organization to comply with its tasks without any kind of pending uncertainties would be endangered.

Also with regard to the other fundamental element of the verification regime, inspections of chemical industry, more stringent provisions could have been adopted: the overall regime of article VI, Verification, appears somewhat fragile to us.

Preventing misuse of technology and equipment for purposes prohibited by the Convention should apply evenly worldwide to the entire chemical industry and not on a selective basis only to areas of greater concentration of industry. No areas of the world should be free from the deterrence provided by the provisions on verification of industry, because these provisions are there to strengthen the credibility of the Convention and reassure States parties about compliance.

(Mr. Negrotto Cambiaso, Italy)

In particular, we cannot conceal a certain disappointment at the too narrow definition of the so-called "capable" facilities. In Schedule 3 inspections we have noted that, according to WP.400/Rev.1, the extent of access to be granted to the inspection team to other parts of the plant-site for clarification of ambiguities has been left totally to the discretion of the inspected State party. In our view, managed access procedures should have been included for the rest of the plant-site too.

Our "cahier de doléances" is related also to other parts of WP.400/Rev.1. I will not dwell on those.

It is always a difficult task to reconcile differences in analyses and diverging perceptions relating to security of States by means of unified approaches acceptable to all. In particular, in our negotiations we have witnessed a basic conflict between those who, for the protection of their security interests, were wiling to rely on an international organ entrusted with wide and effective powers of investigation and those who, rather, were essentially concerned with the protection of their most sensitive facilities or, simply, of their own domestic privacy as a reflection of a given political or historical reality. The basic question at this stage is whether WP.400/Rev.1 can be considered as a compromise that would not, at the end of the day, endanger essential security interests. We firmly believe the draft Convention in no case jeopardizes the security interests of any State.

For these reasons, the Italian Government is ready to join all those who have so far indicated their readiness to endorse WP.400/Rev.1 as a compromise text, a text providing a concrete opportunity to live up, within the prescribed time-frames, to the political mandate entrusted to us by the General Assembly. We are encouraged to note that our assessment is being shared by a large majority of States. This does not exclude readiness on our part to actively search in the coming days, within the deadline of 7 August, for any possible improvement, on the basis of consensus, to the draft Convention.

Futhermore, we expect that the future Convention will be rewarded by universal adhesion. It is in fact disclosing in a yet imperfect and preliminary way, but with a scope unprecedented for a global security agreement, a whole new set of competences entrusted to organs of the international community in order to consolidate a framework of precise, binding and verifiable rules.

We do not see how, without the gradual establishment of such multilateral "security nets" across the world, we could prevent either single States from relying on their own national means as the sole way of monitoring compliance or the United Nations from being forced too often to resort to extreme measures in order to restore the rule of international law.

Italy joins those who believe that we have come to the moment of truth for the conclusion of the chemical weapons negotiations and feels all the responsibility of not missing this probably unique opportunity. The

(Mr. Negrotto Cambiaso, Italy)

conclusion of the ban on chemical weapons will have a decisive impact on the future of the CD. Thought-provoking evaluations and ideas for the "post-chemical-weapons era" are already being aired in this chamber. I am grateful to all those colleagues who are offering such reflections and, while associating myself with their expectations, I hope we may all soon have the opportunity to concentrate on such a promising approach.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I should like to extend to you the particular satisfaction of the Argentine delegation at seeing you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament. You are a diplomat of acknowledged professional competence and this has been clearly demonstrated inter alia through your personal efforts and the various functions you have exercised in the bureau for the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention, personal efforts which, I should like to emphasize, we value highly and have helped to move the negotiations forward significantly. I am certain that your presidency will give an impetus to the final hours of the negotiations on an instrument whose conclusion is already virtually a reality.

Thank you as well for the tireless efforts of our colleague the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador von Wagner of Germany, to whom we are very grateful for the devotion, transparency and equanimity with which he exercises his high and delicate office.

The aim of my statement this morning is fully to support the draft Convention submitted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons which is contained in document WP.400/Rev.1. As I had occasion to say within the limited framework of the Ad Hoc Committee on 26 June last, for my delegation this draft is the minimum that can be permitted if the Convention is to continue to be defined as a treaty of real significance. In the view of my delegation, some of the amendments that have been submitted to its text would unnecessarily, I would almost say dangerously, weaken its articles, especially as regards its verification system, and speaking in all frankness, I wonder what would then be the advantage of acceding to a Convention that did not adequately meet elementary concerns of global security. I think that worse than the lack of security would be the illusion of security that we would be creating.

Argentina, like others in this negotiating chamber, has its list of wishes left unfulfilled and aspirations curtailed for the sake of consensus. We, like many others, would have wished to see a stronger system of challenge inspection, without so many ways for the inspected State to complicate the work of the international inspectorate. We would have also wished to see a less ambitious and costly system for verification of the chemical industry. We are also concerned that the order of destruction might be altered and we are not entirely convinced of the advantages of incorporating the concept of

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

conversion in the instrument. I could go on like that with a long list of issues, but I don't think it is necessary as my delegation has made its views known on several occasions. Documents such as the Mendoza Declaration are clear evidence of our objectives and purposes at this final stage of the negotiations.

What I would like to stress is that everybody, absolutely everybody around this table, has made important concessions. And we have done so because, I believe, that we consider that the security of one and all will be increased once this Convention enters into force. Of this we are convinced.

I trust that this last stage in the negotiations will be truly the last and that very soon we shall be able to devote ourselves to the tasks of the preparatory phase. Argentina is also confident that it is possible for the Conference to submit a consensus draft convention to the General Assembly within the next few weeks. We are prepared actively to contribute to that end between now and 7 August.

We should endeavour to achieve that objective, but without forgetting that, as this body's precedents indicate, it is not the main goal in the hierarchy of the objectives and priorities of the Conference on Disarmament. What is is to have a sound and effective treaty that is very hard to breach.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Viet Nam, Ambassador Nguyen Luong.

Mr. NGUYEN LUONG (Viet Nam) (translated from French): Mr. President I have the honour and privilege of congratulating you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to wish you every success in your important duties.

I shall confine my statement to a presentation of the views of Viet Nam on the draft Convention on Chemical Weapons and more specifically on certain points which require further in-depth exchanges of views in order to achieve a consensus acceptable to all and reflecting in an equitable and balanced fashion the convergent interests of an ever more interdependent world. Of course, these are points to which my country attaches great importance and in which its interest is unflagging, especially now, in view of its commitment to work for the development of an international political environment conducive to its economic and social development.

With respect to the draft Chemical Weapons Convention, it gives me great pleasure to commend all those, particularly the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, who contributed to the preparation of document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1. In view of its history of struggle for national independence, Viet Nam welcomes all efforts to prepare a convention on chemical weapons that ensures its own observance and application by safeguarding the legitimate interests of the developing countries.

(Mr. Nguyen Luong, Viet Nam)

At first sight this logic may appear rather contradictory, but its negation often leads to pessimism as expressed in phrases such as "delicate balance" or "now or never". Between viability and rapidity, we must, I think, choose the possible that will lead to universality.

In other words, even though my delegation considers document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 as a monumental piece of work, it is not yet a finished product, something that cannot be improved or that is taboo and must not be touched because of its fragility. Having said this, I should like to express the complete support of Viet Nam for the amendments tabled by 14 countries in document CD/CW/WP.417.

The most sensitive point for Viet Nam is the mentioning of herbicides as means of warfare in the body of the draft of the convention. Everyone will remember that there were footnotes to articles I and II of the draft. With document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 a metamorphosis has occurred and it can be seen in the preamble, in wording devoid of any obligation.

Reference has been made to the ENMOD Convention. Viet Nam is a party to that Convention, to which 55 States are currently parties and 17 signatories. Viet Nam cannot accept the viewpoint whereby reference can be made to this Convention with respect to the use of herbicides as a means of warfare because no article, no paragraph of that Convention deals with this issue of the use of herbicides as a means of warfare.

The herbicides used in the southern part of Viet Nam in high concentrations and over a wide area on several occasions during the Viet Nam war are certainly chemicals and among them Agent Orange contains dioxin. Living beings and nature in the regions subjected to the spraying are feeling the effects of this use of herbicides in Viet Nam even today. I use the words "living beings" because it is not just Vietnamese civilians who are affected but also each side's belligerent armed forces. Scientists the world over have studied dioxin and Viet Nam veterans have in-depth knowledge of this subject. It is my firm conviction that the draft Convention would gain in viability and universality by incorporating a reference to the use of herbicides as a means of warfare in article I and consequently in the new subparagraph (b) to article X, paragraph 7, and in an addition to part XI, paragraph 1, as proposed in document CD/CW/WP.417, pages 1, 7 and 19. The delegation of Viet Nam, in associating itself with the amendments proposed by the 14 countries in WP.417 welcomes the position taken by Sweden, Indonesia and Cuba advocating the explicit reference to the prohibition of the use of herbicides as a means of warfare in article I of the Chemical Weapons Convention because such a position merely reflects an undeniable truth, a responsible attitude, a resolve to prevent abuses in the use of toxic chemicals for purposes of war.

With respect to verification my delegation will confine itself to a general comment. Modern-day chemistry is the product of high technology and while the borderline between the civilian and military applications is easily

(Mr. Nguyen Luong, Viet Nam)

recognizable in the developing countries, in the case of industrialized countries it is often indistinguishable even though it is palpable. Everything depends on the interests at stake or the good will of the country concerned.

That is why verification, though necessary, even imperative in specific circumstances, should not serve as a pretext to check all chemical production and trading activities, to gain access to confidential technological information or impede or condition the transfer of technology. Challenge inspections should be conducted with respect for national sovereignty and the treatment of abuses should not be confined to financial implications, as stated in article IX, paragraph 23. Instead the deterrent effect could be obtained by, for example, the suspension for a specific period of the right to request an inspection or to participate in it. To that end the amendments of the group of 14 countries to article IX represent a contribution to the establishment of a viable balance.

Those are a few opinions my delegation wished to contribute in order to further discussion on the pending issues.

Before concluding I should like to thank the Ambassador of Australia, His Excellency Mr. Paul O'Sullivan, for having distributed the declaration of the Third Regional Seminar on Chemical Weapons, held in Sydney last June, to which Viet Nam fully subscribes.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Viet Nam for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Wagenmakers.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for me to salute you in your high office. I extend to you the warm congratulations of the Netherlands delegation upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The Australian efforts to make the world a more secure place are well known. Your country has a proud track record in this respect. All of us remember its latest expression, the tabling by the Australian Foreign Secretary of a draft CW Convention on 12 March last. I express the hope that the jewel in your crown will be constituted by agreement in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on the conclusion this month of the long overdue Chemical Weapons Convention.

I would be remiss if I did not use this opportunity to pay tribute to the great presidency of your predecessor, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán. He steered us ably and effectively through an important period of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Furthermore, I would also like to extend a cordial welcome to new colleagues who have joined us: Ambassadors Sir Michael Weston of the United Kingdom, Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan, Bernard Goonetilleke of Sri Lanka, Don Nanjira of Kenya and Ludwik Dembinski of Poland.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

Some weeks ago the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons took, by consensus, a decision of considerable importance, in particular for the Netherlands. The Committee decided that the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention would be seated in The Hague. As a practical consequence, the Preparatory Commission and and its staff will also be based in The Hague.

You can imagine, that the Netherlands feels honoured by this decision. The outcome of the intensive deliberations on this subject, organized and led with great skill and impartiality by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, bestows on us a heavy responsibility. I am grateful for the confidence delegations have placed in their Netherlands colleagues. My Government and the City of The Hague will gladly take up the challenge to provide the PrepCom and the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons itself with all their needs, in accordance with the offer made. The competent authorities are now in the process of consultations on how best to get things up and running. I can announce that practical preparations have started in The Hague, enabling the PrepCom to start its work early next year.

The decision on the location of the seat of the Organization was not taken lightly. An orderly and clean selection procedure was followed, with clear presentations and offers made by the three competing candidates. I would like to use this occasion to express sincere gratitude and respect to the Governments of Switzerland and Austria for their fair attitude and cooperation, enabling the emergence of a consensus decision on such a sensitive matter.

In June, a first training course for potential future chemical weapons inspectors was held in the Netherlands. Ten technicians from developing countries, including several from non CD-member States actively participated in this "try-out" course. They all showed great eagerness to learn as much as possible from the course. A report of the proceedings will soon be presented to the Ad Hoc Committee. It stands to reason that one would build upon the experience gained for future courses. In this connection it would seem useful to coordinate the Netherlands efforts with those of other States already organizing or contemplating courses for potential future inspectors and analysts, in particular for candidates from developing countries.

Over the years we have spent quite a few moments in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to get our treaty right. We have travelled a long distance. It seems that now, at last, we are close to the end of our efforts.

The Netherlands delegation is grateful for the so-called "June Paper" (WP.400/Rev.1) This paper came about thanks to the untiring efforts of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador von Wagner, who successfully built on structures drawn up by the preceding chairmen and the untiring efforts of the German delegation as a whole.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

On substance, the Netherlands delegation would have preferred a stronger challenge regime than the one that is now contained in WP.400/Rev.1 In particular, the procedures initiating challenge inspections are not very satisfactory and they weaken this important part of the verification regime. Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso of Italy just gave a detailed overview of imperfections to be found in the draft CW Convention text. I endorse his analysis. However, after having considered all parameters, the Netherlands delegation is willing to accept the compromise text as suggested by the Ad Hoc Committee's Chairman and embodied in WP.400/Rev.1.

The Netherlands delegation is, of course, willing to listen to others but may I be permitted to emphasize that, like others, my delegation had problems too. So, considerable restraint in re-opening discussions seems called for. WP.400/Rev.1 represents for 90 or 95 per cent a consensus which was reached after years of negotiations. It comprises many elements suggested by colleagues who now work in the format sometimes referred to as the G-14. In my view we should, all of us, be very careful not to bring in elements which are known to be unacceptable to others. Otherwise we risk disturbing the delicate balance achieved in the draft convention in front of us.

The two main criteria we should apply when considering making new proposals are: can we still improve the text in relation to protecting national security needs and promoting the security needs of the international community? If on that basis other delegations can be convinced of the usefulness of modifying the text of the draft convention and consensus can be achieved on such an amendment, so be it. If not, then restraint should prevail. In this spirit, my delegation approaches and will continue to approach last-minute proposals made by several delegates and a group of delegations.

My delegation has carefully weighed the pros and cons of the present text and, despite some disappointments on, inter alia, the part that I mentioned is prepared to go along with WP.400/Rev.1

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Dichev.

Mr. DICHEV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, as this is the first time I take the floor under your presidency, let me at the outset congratulate you on your election to this high responsible office. I wish a most successful outcome to the year-long work of this forum now under your able guidance. Such an outcome would not be only a deserved recognition of Australia's significant contribution to chemical weapons ban negotiations, but also of your personal merit in this multilateral field.

I take this opportunity to convey my congratulations also to the new leaders of the Japanese, United Kingdom, Sri Lankan, Polish, Cuban and Kenyan delegations. These fresh reinforcements to the CD will help us a lot, I am sure of it, for the successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

(Mr. Dichev, Bulgaria)

As to myself, I will try to be rather concise today, because a great deal has been said already on the two issues I wish to touch upon. I have in mind the draft Convention on Chemical Weapons, and the prospects for the CD to survive as an institution by itself.

A few words now on the first main issue. My delegation adheres to the view that it is hardly necessary any more for the CD to continue to debate whether or not to have a Chemical Weapons Convention. We think that a consensus exists in this regard among CD member States, a fact which is of utmost importance. As to the question when the CD should finish drafting the Convention's text, my delegation holds the view that the answer to it lies in resolution 46/35-C, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, and I quote, "The General Assembly of the United Nations strongly urges the CD, as a matter of the highest priority, to resolve in the forthcoming months outstanding issues so as to achieve a final agreement during its 1992 session".

May I recall in this connection that in a month's time the CD will have closed its 1992 session. Subsequently, there we have the answer we need, in other words the drafting of the Chemical Weapons Convention should be over within the next few weeks. In practical terms this means within the first days of August, so that we may take action as required to submit the draft Convention's text to the forty-seventh regular session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York this year.

In the modest opinion of my delegation, it has become very important at this stage to clarify the matter whether or not the text submitted by my distinguished colleague Ambassador von Wagner could be replaced by another text, though not just any text, but one that would enjoy 100 per cent support and admiration on the part of all CD member States. No text is perfect. My delegation considers that such a text is impossible to work out. Document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 is the crowning result of enormous efforts exerted in the negotiations by all delegations, and especially by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner of Germany.

This text has finally seen the day after so much concession and compromise by all parties concerned. The still fragile consensus that unites us can hardly serve as a foundation for new proposals. The idea for absolute perfection of a given text, the text of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the case that concerns us all, may be rather attractive, but in so far as the chemical weapons ban negotiations are concerned such an idea may well become a trap to miss an historic opportunity.

The Bulgarian delegation fully sides with Ambassador Hyltenius, who declared at a plenary meeting that the "negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention have now reached a stage where they have become a question of now or never". At the same time, we cannot but point out that some of the proposals of the 14 countries make a lot of sense; therefore my delegation is ready to join a consensus solution on them.

(Mr. Dichev, Bulgaria)

According to us, the question which each CD member State should solve for itself is whether document WP.400/Rev.1 infringes dramatically in one way or another upon its national security in its various dimensions. If the answer is no, then it would be logical to assess this document positively. Such is, by the way, the assessment of my delegation.

Bulgaria assesses document WP.400/Rev.1 as a sensible compromise which does not harm its national interests. Like a number of other States which do not possess chemical weapons, Bulgaria could have invoked several reasons to raise pretensions, for instance vis-à-vis the time periods for destruction of chemical weapons, the precise wording of issues of economic and technological development, and on specific financial solutions for the future international Organization, etc. Having said this, we wish to state that in such a delicate field as that of the draft Chemical Weapons Convention, it is practically impossible to achieve an ideal treaty.

My delegation supports document WP.400/Rev.1 in its entirety and submits that it represents the draft of a solid international legal instrument, one that has the potential to achieve its noble objectives.

Bulgaria wishes to reaffirm its intention to be among the first participants of the future Convention, which prohibits chemical weapons on a truly global scale. Should this Convention be adopted, my country will promptly initiate procedures to ratify it.

In conclusion, I should like to come back to the beginning of my statement where I mentioned my intention to speak briefly on a second main issue, namely the efficiency and the right to existence of the CD as an institution. The Bulgarian delegation is convinced that the solution to this second issue is directly linkable to the successful conclusion of the first one. If the CD is able to conclude the CWC by late 1992 by adopting it at the highest possible level, as was proposed, then there would be no doubt that the CD has a future, that it has in store before it lots of serious and responsible work to do on other conventions, conventions that would be of major importance for the security of the planet we all live in in this nuclear age.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Morales.

Mr. MORALES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): May I express the great satisfaction and the signal honour I feel on this, the first occasion for me to take the floor at a meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. From our Foreign Ministry in Havana we have been following closely the course of the discussions on the items in the agenda of the Conference and it is a privilege for me to be able to express Cuba's views on the current stage of the negotiating process for the draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and on some issues which we deem essential for the future work of this forum and which will have to be the subject of our special attention in the coming months.

(Mr. Morales, Cuba)

I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your appointment as President of this Conference and to reiterate the readiness of the Cuban delegation to assist you in the fulfilment of the high office we have assigned to you.

The negotiations on a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction have, it seems, entered their final stage. Document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 introduced by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador von Wagner, is the result of a laudable effort made by him personally along with a group of colleagues, assistants and the secretariat, and reflects a large number of ideas, suggestions and proposals from the majority of the countries that have been actively participating in the negotiations on this international instrument. We have within the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons agreed to make further efforts to meet the just concerns still outstanding in respect of this document and to consider these concerns in an equal manner and on an equal footing with the amendments subjected to document CD/CW/WP.400. I should like at this meeting of the Conference to reiterate the readiness of my Government to exert all necessary efforts to achieve a balanced convention reflecting the interests and aspirations of all members, as indeed of the other countries that have been participating in the negotiations on this draft convention.

As recognized and reflected in the relevant reports of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 requires essential adjustments to turn it into what we all want - in other words, a consensus document supported by all members of the Committee, and not just by a group of them, so that it can be adopted by the Conference and subsequently submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration. We are all committed to this process being carried out as soon as possible. Despite this desire by the members of the Ad Hoc Committee, it is worth recalling the agreement that our countries reached before the forty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly and that was clearly reflected in the Assembly's resolution 46/38 C, operative paragraph 2, namely to intensify the work of the Conference with a view to completing in 1992, and not specifically this summer, the negotiations on the draft Chemical Weapons Convention. This commitment should be in all our minds in this final stage of the negotiations. The delegation of Cuba considers that if an additional, serious and responsible effort is made by all the members of the Ad Hoc Committee to cater to the just concerns of a large proportion of the countries belonging to the Committee, we could successfully discharge the responsibility assigned to us and do so this summer.

Cuba's specific proposals for amendment of the draft Convention prepared by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons have already been introduced and circulated by the secretariat, so I am not going to refer to them in detail on this occasion. I shall just mention those that we deem most relevant.

(Mr. Morales, Cuba)

The issue of herbicides and the prohibition of their use as a method of warfare has for many years been a position of the Cuban delegation and must be clearly reflected in the final text of the convention to be adopted. This position of Cuba is in turn shared by a large number of States members of the Conference and hence there is a need to find an appropriate solution that will reflect their legitimate interests within the framework of the convention. We are not seeking the establishment of controls or of limits on the production of herbicides by any country, much less the subjecting of production facilities to inspections of any kind. Nor are we seeking the banning of the use of herbicides for certain well-defined military needs. What we want is to prevent a repetition in future, elsewhere in the world, of monstrous scenes of past wars because there is no international instrument that categorically prohibits all possibility of the recurrence of such tragedies.

As they are for the rest of the delegations here present, the structure, composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council are issues of special interest for the Cuban delegation. The debates on these issues within the Ad Hoc Committee have been highly complex and the understandings reached appear to be close to a consensus, but an additional effort is required to achieve it, as can be clearly seen from the proposals that have been submitted on this matter by several countries, including mine.

Cuba, which has been taking an active part in the intensive consultations that have been held on this subject in the course of the year, remains convinced of the fairness of its claim that the executive body of the future Organization should not follow the undemocratic model found in other international organs whereby a distribution of posts in these bodies is imposed upon us, guaranteeing a very small number of countries a permanent presence there - a privilege which spares them from being subject, as the others are, to a democratic election process. The delegation of Cuba would like to reiterate at this meeting of the Conference that it cannot support such an arrangement, especially if the idea is reflected in the text of the Convention.

At the beginning of this year, on the occasion of a plenary meeting like this one, there burst into our work two ideas considered by many delegations, including ours, as contrary to the central goal of the agreement we are trying to achieve and harmful to the early and satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations which are taking place within the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I am referring to the idea of extending the deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons arsenals and the corresponding production facilities and to the idea of converting such facilities for use in carrying out activities not prohibited by the Convention. While it is not unaware of the reasons which, in the view of some delegations, justify the concerns accompanying the proposals connected with these two ideas, the delegation of Cuba, as it has already stated on previous occasions, is not in a position to support the inclusion of provisions on these issues in the text of the future Convention.

(Mr. Morales, Cuba)

There is a matter of extreme delicacy for Cuba and which we have already referred in the context of our negotiations on the future Chemical Weapons Convention. Today, on precise instructions of my Government, I should like once again to refer to this matter. As is known, the United States Government possesses, against the will of the Government and the people of Cuba, a naval base on territory usurped from our country in the eastern part of the island, where troops are stationed and there are stocks of military supplies and equipment without it being possible to rule out the presence of nuclear and/or chemical weapons for which the Government of the United States bears sole responsibility and must therefore assume all the consequences deriving from that fact. Because of this, the Government of Cuba cannot assume any commitment or any responsibility within the context of the aforementioned Convention that relate to the possible presence of chemical weapons or production facilities for such weapons on the territory of the said base or to their future fate. I am making this statement on behalf of my Government to be duly reflected in the official records of the Conference.

Once the negotiations on the draft Chemical Weapons Convention are concluded, the Conference on Disarmament will have to take up a series of issues of vital importance for the continuation of its work as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. For this reason, permit me to set out some ideas and suggestions of a general nature on these questions with the sole purpose of helping in the search for the most appropriate solutions to each of them during the process of informal consultations to be carried out to this end.

The amendment of the agenda of the Conference is, in the opinion of the Cuban delegation, one of the most important, serious and delicate questions we shall have to examine with a view to finding a compromise solution reflecting the interests of the majority of the members of the international community and not the desires of a small group of countries. On the new agenda of the Conference we should therefore keep those items which enjoy wide support and what we must do is find a way that will lead us to solutions consistent with the interests of the majority, demonstrating the necessary political will to this end and refraining from obstructive practices which have to date impeded the conclusion of agreements on matters identified as priority issues by the international community. I am referring most particularly to the items related to nuclear disarmament. The question of the total prohibition of nuclear tests is, in the opinion of the Cuban delegation, one that ought to appear in any version of the agenda of this Conference, since the set of problems associated with it is the essential prerequisite for any comprehensive and irreversible process of genuine multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The draft comprehensive test-ban treaties that have been put before the Conference on Disarmament will be useful in this endeavour.

Another item that in our view will also have to be kept on the agenda of the Conference is that relating to the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is an indispensable minimum requirement that the countries that do not possess nuclear weapons should receive, as an elementary

(Mr. Morales, Cuba)

gesture of reciprocity, assurance that they will not be subject either to threats or to attacks with such weapons. The assurances offered in this respect must be unconditional and legally binding. The ideas which have been put forward so far in the Ad Hoc Committee on this item contain the embryo of the solution to the problem.

Other items related to the nuclear disarmament process remain valid and suitable for inclusion in a new agenda of the Conference. The definition of these items must, for practical purposes, be specific and clear; that will make possible not only the general exchange of views on these subjects, but also the identification of specific aspects on which concrete negotiations can be held.

In putting forward these ideas the delegation of Cuba is not unaware either of the changes that have occurred in the international arena or of the precise circumstances that have to date prevented progress in the work of this Conference on the issues I have mentioned. Quite the contrary. It is precisely because we are aware that the threat of a nuclear conflict, even though it has declined, has not vanished and because we are convinced that technological development will soon lead to more complete mastery, and hence to more localized and general use of nuclear weapons that we consider that the items I have mentioned require that all of us make an additional effort, a sufficiently serious effort to enable us to do away once and for all with the threat that has weighed and weighs on mankind, jeopardizing its very existence. The nuclear-weapon States bear the greatest responsibility for redressing the present inequality.

In analysing the problems involved in the possible restructuring of the agenda, the Cuban delegation appreciates that the agenda should reflect the interests of one and all. It is therefore prepared to consider proposals that are made to this end with the greatest possible flexibility.

Many other delegations have already said that the current political grouping in the Conference corresponds to an order of things that has been overtaken by events. We too are of that opinion and hence we consider that the time must be nigh when, with due deliberation, we should take up this delicate matter and find a solution to it.

Closely linked to this question is the problem of increasing the membership of the Conference. As this is a negotiating body, it is essential to maintain a membership which, by being representative, enables effective negotiations to be carried out. Any increase in the membership of the Conference should be made with due observance of the principle of equitable geographical distribution, that being understood as the proportion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament which each of the groups to be set up would have on the basis of the total number of countries they represent and not, as now happens, a system whereby those who are the least represented paradoxically constitute the majority of the countries in the international community.

(Mr. Morales, Cuba)

This will not be the last occasion for us to refer to these items. We hope that next time we take the floor in the plenary of this Conference on Disarmament it will be to express our gratification at having achieved consensus in the negotiations to conclude the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage.

Mr. TEFIANI (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, I would like to make a brief announcement, but first I cannot allow my concern for brevity to prevent me from saying how pleased the Algerian delegation is to see you presiding over our work. I can assure you of my delegation's willing and full cooperation in the performance of your duties. As for the announcement, I would like to inform the members of the Group of 21 that a meeting of the contact group on chemical weapons will take place in Room C-108 immediately after the consultations on transparency that will follow the present plenary meeting. The purpose will be to inform them about the meeting of the Bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons which took place this morning.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement. Are there any other representatives who wish to take the floor?

Mr. RANJBAR (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I had an opportunity to express my congratulations on your assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in late June. However, it does not preclude me from saying how happy the Iranian delegation is at seeing you in the Chair.

I took the floor to put on record some observations regarding the views expressed about the draft Chemical Weapons Convention, WP.400/Rev.1, this morning. It was stated that the proposed amendments to WP.400/Rev.1 are dangerous for the Convention and will weaken the verification system. On behalf of the Iranian delegation, as a member of the developing States who proposed some amendments to the present text, I wish to state that proposing the amendments is not dangerous. What is really dangerous at this stage of the negotiations would be the inability of the Ad Hoc Committee to achieve a consensus text. The aim of the joint efforts by a group of developing countries is to reach a compromise and finally a consensus text.

The security perception of each State could be different than others. This delicate point and the art of diplomacy should be taken into account in order to strive to find the best common security perception. In such multilateral efforts as concluding the security agreement of a chemical weapons convention, it is absolutely essential to consider the question of security on a comprehensive basis. If we want to move towards a consensus text, there is no way but taking into consideration the security concerns of the others. Once again I must emphasize that proposing amendments to the present text is not dangerous. What would be dangerous is lack of consensus, which could jeopardize the credit of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland): Mr. President, first of all I would like to associate myself with the congratulations addressed to you by previous speakers on the occasion of your taking the presidency of this body. I would also like to thank you for the kind words of greeting which you extended to me and to tell you how honoured I am to join this august body. I am very fortunate indeed to be joining it at the very moment when the long labours of the Conference are about to bear fruit.

I refer, of course, to the Chemical Weapons Convention. My Government is determined to do its best to contribute to this process. My delegation has already stated in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons its support for the last draft of the Convention, which represents, in our opinion, a fair reflection of the negotiations and the best available result of them. The effective verification system of the Convention has been and remains of key importance to our delegation. We have strived for a stronger verification regime, in particular, concerning challenge inspection. We are aware of existing differences. For this reason the proposed solutions in the draft, although not fully meeting our expectations, provide us with a reasonable and balanced compromise on a few issues where consensus eluded us. In this respect, we have to be careful not to re-open the Pandora's box which could jeopardize the adoption of the Convention because, as has been stated, the adoption of the Convention is now or never. Re-opening the discussion could lead to the weakening of the efficient implementation of the Convention by undermining the confidence the States parties should have in the compliance of others, and by weakening the deterrence against eventual violations.

On our part, we are strongly committed to the effective Chemical Weapons Convention. Its conclusion this year will undoubtedly bring on the Conference a windfall of praise, but this hopefully will be only the first successful step on the road to further disarmament agreements on which the Conference will certainly continue to progress. I feel very privileged to be joining you at this particular juncture and I hope to be able to make a contribution to the further work of the Convention.

The PRESIDENT: Are there any other representatives who wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none. That concludes the list of speakers for today.

The secretariat has distributed today the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. This may be the case, as we are still considering some sections of the annual report and only one subsidiary body has concluded its work. As I noted earlier, I do hope that we will advance our work substantially on our annual report during the coming week. If there are no comments or proposals, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

(The President)

As announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal open-ended consultation, in this room and with interpretation services, to consider pending questions relating to our draft annual report to the General Assembly. Immediately afterwards, another informal open-ended consultation will be held with the same services by the Special Coordinator for agenda item 9, "Transparency in armaments", Ambassador Zahran of Egypt.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany): This is more or less under "any other business" of the meeting and I apologize for taking the floor. Nevertheless, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has put forward, with the help of the secretariat, a revision 1 of this week's timetable, that is, for this afternoon and for tomorrow, and I would like to draw delegations' attention to that, since it implies that there will be not only the already scheduled open-ended consultations of the Editing and Drafting Group this afternoon from 3.00 p.m. to 5.00 p.m. but also open-ended consultations on substance of the draft Convention from 5.00 p.m. to 8.00 p.m. in Room V, and as for tomorrow, the already scheduled meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee at 10.00 a.m. will be held as already scheduled. There will be a continuation of open-ended consultations on substance from 3.00 p.m. to 6.00 p.m. and the open-ended consultations of the Editing and Drafting Group which was scheduled for 3.00 p.m. will be deferred to 6.00 p.m. I just wanted to draw your attention to that and the attention of delegations and I apologize for having taken the floor.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is certainly no need to apologize. It is, in fact, useful to the Committee to have that revision 1 drawn to our attention.

Are there any other comments then before I propose to adjourn the meeting? I see none.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 6 August, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.629
6 August 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 August 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Paul O'Sullivan (Australia)

GE.92-62560/4802B (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 629th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As announced at our last plenary meeting, I intend to put before the Conference today for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. We shall proceed to do so once the list of speakers is exhausted. I should like also to inform you that, immediately after this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an open-ended consultation on the draft report to the General Assembly, during which I hope we will advance substantially our work on that question.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of France, Chile, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Canada, Romania, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Finland and Japan. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): I have already had an opportunity, Sir, during my last statement to the Conference, to tell you how pleased my delegation was to see you presiding over our work with your competence, authority and high ideals. As you come to the end of your term of office, allow me simply to add that we have greatly appreciated, and in the coming hours or coming days - a crucial period in our work - we will continue to appreciate, your great qualities and the important role that your country plays within the Conference.

I asked for the floor to announce to the Conference that on 3 August, France formally deposited its instruments of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with the three depositary Governments, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation, as successor to the USSR. As is well known, it was the arms control and disarmament plan submitted by France on 3 June 1991 that contained my country's decision in principle to accede to the NPT. The domestic accession procedure was recently completed with the unanimous - I stress this point - adoption by the French Parliament of the law authorizing the Government to accede to the Treaty. When depositing its instruments of accession, France stressed that in becoming a party to the Treaty it confirmed its long-standing commitment to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to contribute to disarmament. It acted in conformity with its responsibilities in this field, responsibilities which it has always shouldered. Indeed, France solemnly declared in 1968 that it would henceforth behave exactly like the States which decided to become parties to the Treaty. Our formal accession is an illustration of our resolve to take an active part in the general effort to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, one of the major priorities of the international community, as was recalled by the Security Council meeting at head of State and government level on 31 January.

(Mr. Errera, France)

France firmly intends to strive, in cooperation with its partners, for the universality of the Treaty and its extension in 1995 for an indefinite period, and to seek the broadest possible international consensus on the subject of nuclear non-proliferation. The strengthening of the non-proliferation regime should, we feel, make it easier to reconcile strict respect for the imperatives of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the legitimate use of the peaceful applications of atomic energy, under international control, which can meet energy and economic development needs.

Every day brings further confirmation of the growing interdependence between international security, disarmament and non-proliferation. The impulse we are now observing for a real reduction in nuclear overarmament, the strengthening of the international consensus against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the fresh prospects for the peaceful settlement of certain regional conflicts, are all positive factors which consolidate security for each and every one of us. For the task is indeed, in particular for the great majority of developing countries, which comply with their commitments, that of reconciling the upsurge in cooperation with the industrialized countries with the constraints imposed by international security. And where better to achieve such a balance than in the multilateral context?

The nuclear-weapon States have a crucial role to play in this process. The fact that all five of them are now parties to the NPT undoubtedly creates new conditions in this regard. As far as the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is concerned, France will, inter alia, step up the efforts it has already undertaken, in particular in the Conference on Disarmament, in order to allow those States which have signed an international undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons to enjoy a legally binding assurance on the part of the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

This is the information I wished to put before the Conference. We attach the greatest possible importance to the role which the Conference on Disarmament can and must play in helping to build a fairer and safer international order.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Chile, Ambassador Tironi.

Mr. TIRONI (Chile) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, it gives me great satisfaction to take the floor for the first time in this Conference at a time when you are in the Chair. We congratulate you again on your active role at its head and the important part that Australia has played in giving impetus to the negotiations on chemical weapons this year. Allow me also to welcome the recent announcement by the Ambassador of France of France's formal accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(Mr. Tironi, Chile)

We have asked for the floor because the member and non-member countries of this Conference have been invited to express their views on the draft chemical weapons convention which appears in document 400/Rev.1. Consequently I shall first refer to this subject and then to some other matters relating to disarmament.

It is no secret to anyone in this room that Chile supports the option of giving the international community a convention that will completely and finally ban chemical weapons. We have also said that we wish to be among the first to be parties to the future international instrument, and at the subregional level we have signed what is known as the Mendoza Agreement with Argentina and Brazil which transformed this internal decision into an international commitment. We also value what has been said in the Cartagena Declaration on the same topic, which was signed by the Andean countries.

Bearing this background in mind, my Government embarked on a careful study of the draft in question, and reached the conclusion that overall this convention is acceptable for Chile. As other delegations have found, this text is not fully satisfactory in some aspects as far as we are concerned, but we are aware that like any other outcome of negotiations, a set of compromises have been reached that it would be damaging to break. Hence we are ready to accept aspects that are not satisfactory because we feel the time to adopt this convention is now. We have no right to defer this agreement any further. If we do not take advantage of the prevailing political momentum and the positive attitudes of the majority of delegations present in this forum, there is a risk that this convention could be deferred, perhaps indefinitely. Furthermore, it would deal a harsh blow to faith in the ability of this Conference to be the proper place for reaching disarmament on the scale yearned for by the international community today.

For my country one unsatisfactory aspect of the draft convention as it now stands is the distribution of seats on the executive council. Besides the political significance of this matter, we are concerned at the precedent that may be laid for future disarmament conventions. The distribution of seats on the executive council has been clearly unfavourable to Latin America vis-à-vis other regions. We believe that the constructive approach shown by our region in the negotiations on chemical weapons has not been given due recognition. In addition, the proportion of permanent seats on the basis of chemical industry seems to us excessive in the case of Latin America. We feel it is fair to give some sort of representativeness to the chemical industry and to take into consideration costs and economic assessments, but not to the extent that such factors can dictate decisions to the detriment of stricter and more rigorous measures of control.

What is essential for Chile is to create machinery that would provide opportunities for participation to all States active in disarmament, rather than to the defenders of the status quo. We therefore propose that any amendment to the chapter on the executive council should take into account the need to readjust Latin American representation in that organ of the future organization. However, despite this and other difficulties, I wish to reiterate that overall my country accepts the draft presented by the Chairman

(Mr. Tironi, Chile)

of the Committee, Ambassador von Wagner. We also congratulate him and his delegation for the great diplomatic skill deployed in conducting these intensive negotiations. For our part, as a manifestation of our resolve to implement the convention speedily, we reiterate our readiness to organize a regional seminar that would help to put the chemical weapons convention into practice.

We have listened with much interest to what has been said by several delegations in this plenary about the appropriateness of restructuring the Conference's agenda and expanding the number of member States. In this regard, as other countries have said, we think it would be very appropriate to entrust consultations on these aspects to the Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, who we are sure once again will take these steps not only with his customary tact and intelligence but also with the efficiency required to ensure their success.

I cannot fail to restate the views of my country on the subject of expansion. This is a topic on which a decision has been deferred too long and which has been practically ignored at this session, with the exception of Ambassador Hyltenius and a few others who have shown understanding of the problem. We feel that Chile should become a full member of this forum. We have given sufficient demonstration of our constructive operation and interest in its work. We therefore hope that the report that will go to the General Assembly will be worded in different terms from previous years, so that we can be sure that in the first few months of 1993, the Conference will really set to work to solve this issue. It is essential to bring to bear here the new democratic spirit that prevails in the international community and to enable countries taking specific action towards disarmament to take part on an equal footing in this multilateral forum.

In his recent statement here in June, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of my country, Mr. Edmundo Vargas, while pointing to the pressing need to readjust the agenda and procedures of the Conference to bring them into harmony with the new era we are living through, reaffirmed the priority that Chile attaches to the cessation of nuclear testing, and the role of science and technology in disarmament, security and development. I wish to highlight the fact that these last points are closely connected with the conversion of armaments industries, and with nuclear safety which is threatened by the obsolescence of various plants. We also attach high priority to the establishment of an international register of arms transfers. Lastly, the Under-Secretary raised here the possibility of convening in the near future another regional conference in Latin America on mutual confidence-building and security-building measures. We are pleased to report that some delegations from countries in our region have stated that they have already transmitted this proposal to their foreign ministries and are studying it favourably. This will allow us very shortly to go forward with this initiative.

In closing, we are now witnessing every day the suffering of millions of human beings who are victims of the uncontrolled use of weapons of mass destruction. Hence we consider we must not forget that the reason we meet here is to build a climate of trust among peoples so that it will become

(Mr. Tironi, Chile)

increasingly less necessary to have recourse to weapons in order to attain peace. It is with this objective in mind that Chile supports the conclusion very shortly of the convention on chemical weapons, and it is ready to continue to adopt measures in the sphere of disarmament and arms control to promote international security and world peace.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Nasseri of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who will introduce the report of that subsidiary body, as contained in document CD/1160.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Allow me first of all, Mr. President, to express my satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair and to wish you success in discharging your weighty responsibility at this important and perhaps hectic juncture of our work. Your diplomatic skill and experience will no doubt contribute significantly to a satisfactory conclusion of the work of the Conference on Disarmament this year.

I have asked for the floor to introduce the draft report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, as distributed in document CD/1160, which was adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee at its last meeting on 3 August 1992 as document CD/SA/CRP.20/Rev.1.

As in the case of other ad hoc committees, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances and its report have also been affected by the focus and attention this year given to the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to enable it to conclude negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons within 1992. However, this form of abridged meetings and report have not prevented us from pin-pointing the substantive work which I am confident will be pursued with more vigour next year.

In addition to the so-called technical part of the report, reflected in the first and second sections, the third part has highlighted some important achievements this year. Paragraph 5 notes that "these consultations reveal that all delegations, including those of the nuclear-weapon States, continued to attach importance to the agenda item and were ready to engage in substantive discussions on the issue". This progress, namely acceptance by all delegations instead of a majority, marks noticeable progress which can facilitate our work next year.

Part 4 of the report sets out the conclusions and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee, stating that "the formal debates and informal consultations demonstrated the readiness of delegations to continue the search for a common approach on the substance of negative security assurances". Finally, the Ad Hoc Committee has agreed to recommend by consensus to the Conference on Disarmament that the Committee should be re-established at the beginning of the 1993 session.

(Mr. Nasseri, Islamic Republic of Iran)

In the light of recent developments in international relations which have been highlighted here in the Conference on Disarmament and the fact that nuclear doctrines need to be reviewed, it is my delegation's conviction that a window of opportunity has been opened to have a fresh look at all subjects pertaining to nuclear weapons, including negative security assurances. I am confident that this opportunity will be seized next year and the Ad Hoc Committee, based on its achievements thus far and a favourable political environment, will register significant achievements in 1993.

While expressing my sincere thanks to all delegations who have placed confidence in me and helped me to carry out my task, I would like to thank the secretariat and the interpreters for their contribution and their help to me in preparing this report which is before the Conference on Disarmament as document CD/1160 dated 3 August 1992 for adoption.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for introducing the report of his subsidiary body and, if I may be permitted to do so, I should like to congratulate him and his Committee for having produced a report which is not only substantive but short, an ideal rarely achieved which deserves emulation, if I may say so. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, we in the Canadian delegation are most appreciative of the work you have done in ably guiding the Conference in its concluding phase this summer and we certainly hope that your efforts will be rewarded with tne conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

Canada has been a member of the Conference on Disarmament and all of its precursors since the original establishment of the first Disarmament Commission (comprising the nine members of the Security Council plus Canada) in January 1952, and we have participated actively in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention since their inception back in 1968. We strongly believe that the current Ad Hoc Committee Chairman's proposed text of a chemical weapons convention (WP.400/Rev.1) is very likely to prove to be the most effective outcome of our recent deliberations that can be obtained. As is also the case for a very large majority of the other members and participating observers working on this item, we stand prepared to accept it in its entirety.

It is also a fact that this text is far from being the ideal chemical weapons convention that Canada would have preferred to see adopted. However, it reflects the result of literally years of thorough, complex negotiations during which many States have had to concede ground on issues which they considered to be extremely important but for which they could not attract the consensus support of others. As it stands now, therefore, the Chairman's text is probably fully satisfactory to none among the CD's member States but despite this, because it is the result in particular of our intensive negotiations during this year's CD session, virtually all of its elements are now generally acceptable. Some States would still like to see further changes adopted. Most of these proposals for changes have been tabled in WP.417 and 419, with others having been put forward by Cuba and Peru. While some

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

among these various proposals are new, most represent old positions that failed to gain acceptance earlier but which are still being pursued. This latter category of would-be amendments, particularly in so far as either they would further weaken the already very much watered-down inspection and verification regime or in that they relate to changes to particular issues of some contention and are already clearly unacceptable to many, seem to have little prospect of adoption. Why then, we wonder, are they still before us? How important are they really, and how crucial are they to the national security or policy concerns of their supporters?

All of us have already had to make compromises to get as far as the text in WP.400/Rev.1, Canada perhaps more than most, since we were and still are among the strongest supporters of a truly confidence-building inspection regime which would be rapid, thorough and comprehensive. Thus, under challenge the old idea of the right to call for inspection any time, anywhere and to have it take place virtually at once without any constraints on the inspectors would still be a provision with which Canada would have felt safest. The challenge provisions now in WP.400/Rev.1 are a far cry from that approach, given the lengthy time-frames, the restrictions on the discretion left to the inspectors, and in the increased degree of protection now afforded to the inspected State party. In the same way, Canada has problems with the provisions on routine inspection of the chemical industry and with the narrow definition of "capable facilities". So we are not, by any means, entirely happy with WP.400/Rev.1 and with the compromises with our own preferred objectives that we have had to make to accept it. Our bottom line, however, is that it would be very foolish of us to allow a wish for only the very best of results to obstruct the possibility of our instead obtaining what is, none the less, an acceptable CWC regime. Even as it is, CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 does meet (albeit in some respects only just) Canada's three basic criteria for an acceptable convention. First, it is comprehensive: it calls for a complete ban on the development, production, stockpiling, retention or use of CW and their precursors. Second, it is global, or at least it has the potential to be so if others too show flexibility: already, like Canada, a significant number of States from all geographic regions have indicated they can support and would be prepared to be original signatories. And we are convinced the vast majority of the rest of the world will join us. Third, it is effectively verifiable: though the regime as I said before is not as strong as we would have wished, it nevertheless establishes new norms of verification and inspection that far surpass any previous multilateral arms control and disarmament instruments.

In Canada's opinion, and this is also our wish, the time has now therefore come for all of us negotiating here in the CD to put aside unrealistic, unachievable long-standing preferences, to resolve our differences and to coalesce behind WP.400/Rev.1. It is, after all, that text which we together, in our long negotiations, as well as our Chairman alone, on the basis of his understanding of what final compromises could prove generally acceptable, have so laboriously constructed. Surely it deserves our common support and we very much fear that, if we cannot achieve a consensus on this text now, we may end up with no CWC at all.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): Mr. President, may I first of all express my pleasure at seeing you in the Chair at this crucial juncture of our deliberations on the chemical weapons convention? Your knowledge of the problem, your skill and devotion to the finalization of the draft convention are widely appreciated. It is our hope that under your guidance we shall be able to attain our objective of coming to a general agreement on the text under discussion. I would also like to express our thanks and appreciation for the important work that has been accomplished by your immediate predecessors, Ambassadors Abdelhamid Semichi of Algeria and Roberto García Moritán of Argentina. May I take this opportunity to welcome in our midst the new colleagues, Ambassador Weston of Great Britain, Ambassador Goonetilleke of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Morales of Cuba and Ambassador Dembinski of Poland? I want to assure all of them of my full cooperation.

I have had occasion to present the position of my delegation with respect to different aspects of the draft convention on chemical weapons in the Ad Hoc Committee on the subject. Now I am in the position to inform the Conference that the Romanian Government, after careful examination of the text of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction, as contained in document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 of 22 June 1992, has decided to accept this text as it is. My Government considers that, like any human undertaking, the existing draft convention could, eventually, be further improved, but the commitment to conclude this convention outweighs by far any other possible considerations. Certainly, if some slight last-minute consensus changes can be accommodated in order to widen the area of adherence to the convention, we are prepared to accept them. However, one has to take into account that the draft convention, like any other such instrument, represents a common denominator, keeping in a carefully thought-out balance the various interests and viewpoints expressed during years of negotiations. As far as Romania is concerned, we are prepared to initial the draft convention at any level on which consensus might be reached, so that the text can be submitted to the coming United Nations General Assembly session for endorsement and recommendation for signature.

Should countries choose to prepare a draft United Nations resolution having a number of co-sponsors, Romania would be very pleased to join such an initiative. In case other forms of submission to the United Nations General Assembly are envisaged, we would be prepared to favourably consider them as well. Romania is also ready to play an active role, at all levels, in the implementation of the future convention, including the entering into operation of the envisaged executive council and the technical secretariat. While congratulating the delegation of the Netherlands on the selection of The Hague as the headquarters of the future organization, we want to assure the Dutch Government of all our support in the fulfilment of its important responsibility as host Government.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): As we approach the end of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, I wish to explain to the Conference the United Kingdom's views on the draft text contained in working paper 400/Revision 1.

When I made my first statement to the Conference just two months ago, I mentioned a number of the points in the chemical weapons convention to which the United Kingdom attached particular importance. It is from this standpoint that I approach the Chairman's text.

First, I mentioned the importance of challenge inspection and the need for a prompt and automatic response to a State party's request for an inspection; for the inspection to be effective and intrusive; and for follow-up action to be taken where necessary, by the executive council and/or the conference of States parties. The United Kingdom believes that the provisions in the Chairman's draft represent the absolute minimum of acceptability, both in respect of the procedures prior to an inspection and in the rapidity and degree of intrusiveness of an inspection. We remain of the view that it is neither necessary nor appropriate for the executive council, as the political organ of the organization, to be involved in the launching of a challenge inspection. By increasing the role of the executive council before a challenge inspection, the text risks undermining the effectiveness of the inspection procedure.

Secondly, I mentioned the need for a challenging State to have the mandatory right to send an observer with the inspection team. We are disappointed that the text contains no guarantee for the challenging State to be able to send an observer. We believe this would have significantly enhanced the effectiveness and confidence-building aspect of challenge inspection. The provision that an observer shall be accepted "as a rule" goes some way to meeting our concerns and we shall be keen to see that it is adhered to in practice. But we find the treatment of the observer in the text far from satisfactory.

Thirdly, I expressed the view that routine monitoring of chemical industry, on a broad and non-discriminatory basis, with well-targeted inspections, was an important element in deterring misuse of civilian chemical plants and of industrially important chemicals. We have always considered such monitoring as the second pillar of the verification structure. The provisions in working paper 400/Revision 1 fall well short of what we believe would be the most effective and efficient regime. In particular, we are disappointed to see that the implementation of the inspection phase for other chemical production facilities is to be delayed and made subject to a decision to be taken at a later stage. We are also disappointed that more importance is not given to the role that States parties might play in helping to target such inspections. The references to so-called PSF facilities are, to our mind, an unnecessary and unhelpful complication. The regimes for schedule 2 and schedule 3 chemicals and facilities have also been undesirably weakened in our view. Despite these shortcomings, the article VI regime as it stands in WP.400/Revision 1 can provide, or at least has the potential to provide, a valuable deterrent against abuse of industrial capabilities.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

Fourthly, I stressed the need for riot control agents, the proper use of which would not be prohibited under the convention, to be declared. We were pleased to see that WP.400/Revision 1 contains the declaration requirement to which we attach so much importance. This to our mind plugs a significant potential loophole in the convention.

Fifthly, I mentioned the problem of old and abandoned chemical weapons and the need for a clear obligation for the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons which may still have military potential. We have some reservations regarding the provisions in WP.400/Revision 1 but we could accept them as part of a compromise package on the basis that they provide for a clear obligation for destruction of such weapons.

Sixthly, I mentioned the general destruction provisions and the need for a clear obligation for destruction, even if the 10-year timetable had to be modified in respect of one major chemical weapons possessor, who has been frank about the problems it faces. Whilst we would, ideally, have preferred no exceptions to the 10-year destruction timetable laid down in the convention, we believe that the overall package contained in WP.400/Revision 1 is an acceptable one, and provides sufficient safeguards to prevent any abuse of the possibility, in certain circumstances, of some relaxation of the requirements of the agreed destruction timetable.

Lastly, I mentioned the executive council and the need to reach agreement on arrangements to elect an efficient and fully representative body to oversee the operation of the convention. We believe that the provisions on composition contained in WP.400/Revision 1 provide for satisfactory arrangements for achieving this aim. We should, however, have preferred the phrase "as a rule", introduced in a well-motivated but unsuccessful last-minute attempt to secure agreement, to be omitted.

It will be clear from what I have said that the draft text contained in WP.400/Revision 1 falls short in a number of respects of what the United Kingdom would, ideally, have wished to see in the convention. This is natural in a compromise document. The text is incidentally very far from the sort of dish which would have been produced, had it been pre-cooked, as some have suggested, by a German chef, with various Western helpers, in an Italian kitchen.

Throughout the long history of these negotiations, my delegation has worked in a constructive spirit in pursuit of a convention which would both meet basic security requirements and be able to attract sufficiently widespread support to bring about a truly global and effective ban on chemical weapons. It is in this spirit, and in the belief that the text represents the best achievable in the foreseeable future that the United Kingdom Government have, after careful consideration, decided that they could accept the text as it stands in WP.400/Revision 1.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

I should make clear that we reached this decision with some misgivings. Our first instinct was to take up the Chairman's invitation to table proposals for amendments. We were persuaded to refrain from this, however, because we realized, from the long and intensive discussions that had taken place earlier, that the key changes we desired were, sadly, unlikely to command the full support of the Ad Hoc Committee and that persistent efforts on our part could risk jeopardizing the Ad Hoc Committee's achievements so far. At the same time, we fully respect the right of others to seek changes to the draft, particularly where issues of highest national priority were at stake.

Over the last two weeks, my delegation has participated fully in the discussions on the various amendments which have been proposed. These discussions are continuing and, I hope, will be successfully concluded tomorrow. I am hopeful that agreement can be reached on a number of improvements to the text. But where proposals for amendments have not proved to be nearer the middle ground than the text of WP.400/Revision 1, I would appeal to the sponsors of those amendments not to persist with them. It is only in this way that we can move forward together towards our common goal and conclude the convention this year.

While I have the floor, I should like to refer to the statement made by the representative of France and to put on record my Government's pleasure at the fact that on Monday last, 3 August 1992, the French Chargé d'affaires in London deposited with the United Kingdom Government an instrument of accession to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. By this act, he completed the action announced by President Mitterrand on 31 May last year and which had been urged upon successive French Governments by my Government and all other parties to the Treaty since the Treaty first came into force more than 20 years ago. France's accession to the NPT is an important step forward for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and, following China's accession in March, brings all nuclear-weapon States into the Treaty. It underlines the redoubled commitment of France and other countries, in the wake of the Gulf war, to uphold and strengthen the international consensus against nuclear proliferation. As a depositary State for the Treaty, the United Kingdom has worked to encourage universal adherence and my Government hope that all other States not party, including important States members of this Conference, will follow France's lead. We look forward to working with France to secure further accessions to the Treaty and to achieving its indefinite extension in 1995.

Mr. POLHO (Finland): We are living the last and decisive days of negotiation on the chemical weapons convention. The delegation of Finland is convinced that the convention has to be finalized now or there is a grave risk of missing the historic opportunity completely - to the detriment of mankind. In this now-or-never situation one has to evaluate carefully the pros and cons of the convention in its present form or in the form that could conceivably emerge after these last two days of negotiations. And to weigh them against the pros and cons of any outcomes that might be achieved in the future, against the risk of not being able to conclude a convention at all.

(Mr. Pölhö, Finland)

Finland has done this evaluation and weighing. The Chairman's text contained in document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 is in various parts considerably different from what we had throughout the years thought should be achieved in the chemical weapons convention. As with many other delegations the main disappointments in that text from our point of view are to be found in the verification parts. Without going into details, our main concerns are centred on the overall effectiveness and objectivity of the regime.

As is well known, the principal focus of Finland's contribution to these negotiations has been technical and scientific. It is a source of satisfaction to us to be able to recognize still some of this input in the text. The loss of intrusiveness in the verification regime has not led to an undue loss of scientific precision whenever science is applied in the implementation of the convention.

For the past 10 days we have carefully studied proposed amendments to the Chairman's text and observed the discussion on them. From the Finnish perspective, only a few of the proposed amendments - two or three, to be more precise - would improve the final outcome. And even then only marginally. The majority of the proposals, if adopted, would weaken the text further. And certain of them in a very considerable manner indeed. The discussion on the proposals has also shown clearly that reaching consensus on the majority of these proposals is very difficult, if not impossible.

Tomorrow, at the end of the day, we may well be in a situation where the best compromise between the widely varying preferred positions of delegations continues to be the Chairman's text. That result is acceptable to the Government of Finland.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): First of all, Mr. President, let me congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation believes that your able guidance will certainly enable us to realize an excellent job in this Conference on Disarmament this year. I also would like to welcome all the new ambassadors who have recently assumed their posts in this Conference.

I asked for the floor to make clear our position on the CWC today. It was some 20 years ago in a completely different international environment that we first embarked on the process of establishing a convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. It was really a daring attempt. For a long period, though, this attempt did not produce any tangible result. Nevertheless, after long painstaking efforts by everybody in the Conference on Disarmament, and under the chairmanship of our dear colleague Ambassador von Wagner, tomorrow we will come to conclude our long process of negotiations on the CWC.

Even at the beginning of this year, only a few people foresaw that we would be able to bridge so large a gap among countries concerned on so many issues in the CWC. Today, we have still quite a number of problems in the draft text of the CWC, some of which, we think, need really to be negotiated for improvement. But we understand that we cannot continue indefinitely our

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

negotiation and we have to share the burdens in one way or another among member States of the CD so that we can eliminate the scourge of CW from the Earth as soon as possible. Further continuation of the negotiation will not necessarily offer us a better perspective for a better CWC; on the contrary, we'll simply lose the momentum and reach nowhere.

The Government of Japan, therefore, strongly hopes that all the necessary process on the CWC will be concluded by the end of this year. As I mentioned a few moments earlier, we still have several points unsatisfactory to us at this moment; nevertheless, we are ready to make it clear that the Government of Japan is studying the draft convention text embodied in document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 with the intention of, in principle, supporting it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I would now like to proceed to make some observations of my own at the conclusion of the Australian presidency. I would also like to take this opportunity to make a statement on behalf of the group of countries known as the Australia Group.

As this is the last plenary over which I will be presiding, I would now like to proceed to make some observations about the operation and the contents of the work of this Conference.

Concerning the operation of the Conference, I would like to note firstly that the four-week rotation of the presidency in my experience makes it very difficult to take forward in any sustained or considered way the many questions that come before the President. In my view many of these issues of both a procedural or substantive kind would benefit from more systematic input and more timely preparation. If we are to continue with this very short rotation period for each President, one consequence could be to give a more prominent and clearly defined role to our Secretary-General. He is the repository of our collective experience and the possessor of the detailed knowledge of what has been going on and what needs to be done. In my view, we need to exploit his rich vein of experience and wisdom.

Another possibility would be to expand the relationship between the current President and his predecessor and successor. Although I can sympathize with this idea I nevertheless have some difficulties with imagining how it might work in practice. Since I understand Ambassador Kamal will be taking up his consultations on improved and effective functioning of our Conference, I hope both of these elements might be given some further consideration, that is to say the issue of the period of each presidency and what we can reasonably expect our Secretary-General and his staff to do.

Turning then to matters of substance, I would first of all want to put on record that it is a matter of regret to my Government that we have not been able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As you will remember, I expressed my frustration at the impasse in our Conference some weeks ago in the hope that, by articulating the disappointment that many of us

(The President)

felt about the difficulties with the re-establishment, there might have been greater efforts to get the Committee into place. But that has not proved to be so up to this point. I recall that the last time the Conference went through a whole annual session without having the Committee, in fact it took several years, I believe seven, before the Committee was finally re-established.

But, of course, there have been many developments of interest in the search for a nuclear test ban, even this week indeed, which ought to have been considered here. These include, not least the moratoriums on testing by France and by Russia and the announcement today by France of its accession to the NPT, which I wholeheartedly welcome of course. Given the very different political climate now, I believe it would be almost inexplicable to our Governments and to the wider interested public if the Conference on Disarmament continued to be unable to address this subject. I certainly anticipate the early re-establishment of this Ad Hoc Committee next year.

The failure to establish an ad hoc committee on transparency in armaments is also, in my view, regrettable. Nevertheless, its inscription on the agenda is a step in the right direction and we appreciate the efforts made by the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, to hold detailed consultations on this subject. It is Australia's view that this Conference needs to pursue actively this issue in 1993.

A notable and welcome feature of this year's activities was the informal open-ended consultations on non-proliferation convened by Ambassador Marin Bosch. We found these discussions interesting, thought-provoking and useful and we hope they will be continued.

Lastly, and most importantly for the Conference this year of course, is the chemical weapons convention. As Ambassador Hyltenius reminded us last week we are now at a decisive moment for the finalization of this treaty. There comes a point in every negotiation of this kind where it is necessary to step back from the minutiae and take a look at the mosaic as a whole. In this case it is more than usually difficult to do so because these negotiations have been going on for so long, because they involve such technically complex details and because above all they go to the heart of national security.

As the negotiations over the past three weeks have shown, the areas of different national preference are well known. Precisely because there are these well-known preferences, some of which are diametrically opposed, we needed the contribution of our Chairman who, at our collective request, undertook the daunting task of developing a complete draft convention that made sense, that would work in practice, that balanced various sets of interests, and that overall would satisfy the minimum security and commercial interests of all States.

I need hardly say that as a consequence he has gone a long way from Australia's preferred position. But as Senator Evans has written to each of your foreign ministers in recent days, we all know that if we are to achieve a

(The President)

convention that is capable of offering to all States a more secure environment and to provide to all States a more confident environment for trade in chemicals, all of us will have to compromise on our national preferences. We believe, as do so many others, that the text in working paper 400/Rev.1 does that in an equitable and fair manner. Despite our wish that some of its contents were different we are prepared to work actively to make it a successful example of a cooperative multilateral endeavour.

This is a matter that involves our professionalism: we are charged with identifying and bringing to fruition the maximum common ground in the areas of arms control and security by negotiating disarmament treaties on a multilateral basis. Failure to do so is not just a matter of regret: it is a test of our credibility and our raison d'être.

It is also the case that there can be a number of activities outside the formal regime of the treaty that could be helpful in clarifying some of the questions that have been raised and which may be a source of false fears.

In this context I wish to refer in particular to the activities of the Australia Group. These are informal consultations on harmonizing export control policies which were initiated in the absence of any global agreement on this subject. This issue has come up in the discussion about article XI of the chemical weapons convention. In order to help address some of the concerns that have been raised in that discussion I am authorized to make the following statement:

"The following States: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, members of the 'Australia Group', welcome the forthcoming signing of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

"This convention, the first multilateral disarmament agreement of a universal character to include an international verification regime, offers a unique opportunity to eliminate a whole class of inhumane and abhorrent weapons.

"The strengthening of world security which will derive from the effective implementation of this convention should be accompanied by increased cooperation among States. This is the objective of article XI of the convention, which the above-mentioned States undertake fully to comply with.

"This article aims at facilitating the fullest possible exchanges in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the convention so as to promote the harmonious economic or technological development of all States parties.

(The President)

"The above-mentioned States are particularly aware of the need to preserve the proper balance between, on the one hand, the imperatives of the economic and technological development of States, especially in the chemical field, and, on the other hand, the security constraints placed upon them.

"The use which can be made of certain chemical products and equipment for purposes prohibited under the convention should cause States which are future parties to the convention to exercise the greatest vigilance so that the desire to ensure the greatest chance of development to all does not as a consequence facilitate, for certain proliferators, prohibited activities which constitute a potential threat to global security.

"The above-mentioned States consider that the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, of which they undertake to be original signatories, will be a most valuable instrument to reach this goal.

"They undertake to review, in the light of the implementation of the convention, the measures that they take to prevent the spread of chemical substances and equipment for purposes contrary to the objectives of the convention, with the aim of removing such measures for the benefit of States parties to the convention acting in full compliance with their obligations under the convention.

"They intend thus to contribute actively to an increase in commercial and technological exchanges between States and to the universal and full implementation of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons."

That concludes the statement on behalf of the Australia Group of countries.

As a subject directly related to the role of the Conference, once we have concluded the chemical weapons convention, I would like to comment on the interventions made by Ambassador Marin Bosch of Mexico. He raised the idea of open-ended consultations at head-of-delegation level to be convened by the President or the Secretary-General to address matters of particular concern or importance. The representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, also made a number of interesting points about our agenda, the expansion of the membership and other questions. The representative of Cuba, Ambassador Morales, advanced as well his ideas and suggestions about these matters, which he defined as of vital importance for the work of our Conference, during his intervention at our plenary meeting last week. These ideas seem to me worthy of further exploration. I have started sounding with some of our colleagues on them, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, and have found positive reactions to further contacts on these questions. But there was insufficient time to consult widely enough about it to allow me to convene such consultations as Ambassador Marin Bosch had proposed. Again, I hope that these ideas might be explored further by the incoming President, to whom I pledge my assistance on this matter, as well as to the Secretary-General of the Conference.

(The President)

Finally, I would like to thank the Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, for his unfailing courtesy, quiet efficiency and his dedication to assisting our work. He and his staff have been a great help to me and they have my thanks and appreciation.

I would also like to pledge to my successor, Ambassador Servais of Belgium, my full assistance and cooperation. He is an able and experienced diplomat and I know the Conference will be in good hands under his stewardship.

That concludes my remarks. Are there any other representatives who would wish to take the floor at this stage? I see the representative of the Ukraine, Ambassador Ozadovski.

Mr. OZADOVSKI (Ukraine) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all I would like to associate myself with the many words of congratulation which have already been extended to you. Your wealth of experience and diplomatic skills will undoubtedly help us to achieve significant progress in the work of the Conference on Disarmament as it concludes its work for this year. Allow me to wish you further substantial success in leading the discussions at this session, and to assure you that the delegation of Ukraine is ready to give you every assistance in carrying out your important duties.

It is my privilege to address the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of the delegation of Ukraine at a time when in the work of the Conference there are clear signs of decisive progress in certain important areas of its activity. In this connection I would like to stress in particular that from the very first steps towards the re-establishment of its statehood, Ukraine solemnly proclaimed and has firmly adhered to the principles of the strengthening of international security, and took an active part in the burgeoning process of disarmament, first and foremost nuclear disarmament. Ukraine, with its significant nuclear potential, was the first State in the history of mankind to voluntarily declare its wish and resolve to rid itself of the whole arsenal of atomic weapons. Speaking recently at NATO headquarters, the President of our country, Leonid Kravchuk, confirmed once again that "Ukraine, one of the largest countries in Europe, will never constitute a threat to other States". Our military doctrine is purely defensive in nature. It is based on the need to have the minimum army and navy required to defend our independence and territorial integrity, the inviolability of our frontiers and the rights and freedoms of our citizens. The creation of Ukraine's own armed forces will go hand in hand with significant reductions in the forces and weaponry which are currently deployed in the country. Having firmly decided to reduce and destroy the nuclear potential which was an inheritance from the former Soviet Union, Ukraine intends in the very near future to ratify the Treaty on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms and, by the end of the century, to rid itself fully of all types of nuclear weapons. As for tactical nuclear missiles, they were all removed from the territory of Ukraine to Russia for destruction as early as May this year, that is to say two months before the deadline established by the Treaty.

(Mr. Ozadovski, Ukraine)

In our country we attach great importance to the implementation of the agreements pursuant to the START Treaty signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992. In accordance with these agreements the Ministry of Defence of the Ukraine, in cooperation with the joint command of the armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, is already engaged in drawing up a joint plan of action to stand down strategic nuclear missiles and remove them from the territory of Ukraine.

In giving due attention to speeding up the process of nuclear disarmament globally by all possible means, Ukraine considers that this process needs to be accompanied by active and specific actions for nuclear disarmament at the national and regional levels. In particular we actively support the idea that the Black Sea should become a nuclear-free zone. Further confirmation of our readiness to contribute to the realization of this idea can be seen in the fact that on 3 August this year, in Yalta, Ukraine and the Russian Federation concluded an agreement on principles to govern the creation of a Ukrainian navy and a Russian navy from the Black Sea fleet of the former USSR. In this document, which is intended to strengthen security in this broad region, the two major Black Sea States officially referred to "the advisability of a policy designed to turn the Black Sea into a nuclear-free zone, a zone of peace and cooperation". The agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea fleet, preparations for which were followed with a great deal of attention not only by the peoples of the two States but also by those of other countries of the Black Sea region and, it can be said without exaggeration, by the whole international community, is based on the provisions of the agreement signed on 23 June this year on further development of inter-State relations between the two countries. Under the agreement the Black Sea fleet will be divided between Ukraine and Russia in order to create a Ukrainian navy and a Russian Federation navy. Bearing in mind the interests of these two friendly States, and in an endeavour to guarantee security in the Black Sea basin, Ukraine and Russia decided that pending the formation in the Black Sea of the Ukrainian navy and the Russian navy they would institute a transitional period up to the year 1995 inclusive.

For the transitional period, the Black Sea fleet was withdrawn from the joint armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States from the moment when the agreement was signed and brought directly under the command of the Presidents of the Ukraine and the Russian Federation. During the transitional period the Black Sea fleet is to be manned by conscripts from the Ukraine and Russia in equal proportions (50 per cent from each). Up until 1995, the parties to the agreement will make joint use of the existing basing systems and matériel, in compliance as appropriate with the legislation of the two countries and without any interference in each other's internal affairs.

The delegation of the Ukraine welcomes the statement made today by Ambassador Errera of France, who informed us that France had acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in August this year. The accession of this nuclear-weapon State to that international treaty is undoubtedly an important step towards the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime for the most lethal type of weapon of mass destruction.

(Mr. Ozadovski, Ukraine)

In taking the floor today, our delegation would also like to inform you that one of the immediate aims of Ukrainian nuclear disarmament policy is to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Achievement of this goal should become a decisive element in putting into practice the fundamental principles of national security which were solemnly proclaimed two years ago by the Parliament of our country in the declaration on the State sovereignty of Ukraine. The most important of these principles is the intention "to become in the future a permanently neutral State which takes no part in military blocs and adheres to the three non-nuclear principles: not to use, to produce or to acquire nuclear weapons". The sincere desire of our country to follow these principles and to back them up with practical actions can be seen in the fact that last month the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine ratified the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the agreement on the principles and procedure for its implementation. The decision adopted by our Parliament on this subject underlines yet again Ukraine's wish to be fully integrated into the pan-European process, to make its own contribution, together with other European States, to the implementation of this most important international legal instrument, one of the main elements of the foundations of the new security system in Europe.

In our view the CFE Treaty has not only made a significant contribution to the reduction of military confrontation and the threat of military conflicts in the continent; its signing marks a substantial change in the mind-sets of recent years. The entry into force of the Treaty will make it possible for all States in Europe, including Ukraine, to build peaceful, good-neighbourly relations amongst themselves in a climate of security and confidence, will help to reduce military expenditure, and will make it possible to direct our efforts first of all towards solving economic and social problems, inter alia, through the conversion of a significant part of the defence industry and military potential.

The present session of the Conference on Disarmament is taking place against the backdrop of a qualitatively new political situation in the world, featuring a shift from ideological divergences and rivalry to extensive international cooperation and partnership. This situation has created a favourable basis for significant breakthroughs in the solution of a number of problems which have accumulated over many years in the field of disarmament, both within the Conference on Disarmament and outside it. The most urgent issue for all the participants in the Conference today is undoubtedly the task of rapidly completing work on the draft convention on chemical weapons. The revised draft of this fundamental document prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and now under consideration in the Conference on Disarmament is the fruit of many years of effort on the part of diplomats, the military, experts and specialists from various countries.

Many delegations have already noted that the draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is a delicate, painstaking balance of interests, an original compromise version taking account of the well-known positions of individual countries. Naturally, we can find many opportunities for improving the text and for further development of it.

(Mr. Ozadovski, Ukraine)

But it may be noted with satisfaction that the majority of delegations have understood the vital need for the rapid conclusion of the convention and are making serious efforts to achieve successful completion of work on the preparation of a final text. Our delegation, like the delegations of many other countries, sincerely hopes that the convention will be opened for signature before the end of this year. We are ready to cooperate further to improve the draft, and if certain other delegations of countries participating in the convention feel it necessary to revert to the submission of amendments and concrete proposals, our delegation also reserves the right to express its own observations on the draft document where necessary.

The new political situation which is developing in the world requires a radical rethink of the conventional approaches to such well-established concepts as security, international cooperation and development. Again we are seeing far-reaching changes on a global scale, which, whether we like it or not, will have an influence on the way States behave and on generally accepted standards and principles. Despite the fact that there is no longer any total military threat, and that there is no longer any balance of terror or direct confrontation, with many people now beginning to rid themselves of the sense of danger that new world wars will break out, nevertheless, tragic events related to military conflicts in a number of regions of the world warn us that such a danger has not completely passed. Because even small local conflicts carry within them major threats to peace. Potential examples of this, unfortunately, are the conflicts in Europe, the most densely populated continent on the planet, which are growing with unchecked speed and extent. Analysis of these conflicts shows that we are now dealing with a new kind of security problem. It is clear that the former military/political stand-off between blocs in separate regions has been replaced by dangerous conflict situations associated with unresolved national issues, caused by irresponsible calls for the revision of existing State frontiers.

In such conditions, naturally, the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe become extremely important. Today, perhaps as never before, there is a need for single-minded creative work to put these principles into practice. This in its turn requires a further all-round improvement of the effectiveness of the CSCE machinery. A significant innovative contribution to the achievement of this aim can, we think, be found in the results of the recent fourth all-European CSCE meeting. However, the present situation requires a further significant boost in the arsenal of means to build peace, including the creation of new instruments to prevent conflict. We fully endorse the proposals drawn up in Helsinki on the use of peace-keeping operations under the CSCE umbrella, including the potential of such organizations as the European Communities, NATO and the Western European Union. At the same time these proposals require more thorough elaboration. We need first and foremost to determine the legal basis for such machinery and the criteria for bringing it into play, taking account in particular of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States. The recent agreements in the military and political sphere and accords in the field of disarmament are of great importance for the

(Mr. Ozadovski, Ukraine)

further stabilization of the situation and the strengthening of security in Europe. I am thinking first and foremost of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna document 1992, the open skies Treaty and the final act of the negotiations on troop numbers in Europe. In this connection, I would like to stress once again that the entry into force of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna document not only make a significant contribution to the reduction of military confrontation and the threat of armed conflicts, but also constitute a radical break with the mind-sets of the past.

In this statement, for obvious reasons, we are dealing mainly with questions of European security and questions of the reduction of armed forces in Europe. But we are convinced that questions of regional security are of great significance for all regions of the world. In the present situation in the world, where a number of old regional and intersational armed conflicts are persisting and new ones are appearing, the role of the Conference on Disarmament, that unique multilateral mechanism, is steadily growing. The completion of work on the draft convention on chemical weapons would seem to mark the end of one of the most important and momentous stages in the work of the Conference. However, our agenda lists new, no less complex tasks related to the guaranteeing of a greater level of international security at lower levels of armaments. In our view the Conference should continue to concentrate the bulk of its attention on drawing up global international legal instruments designed to reduce international tension and consolidate overall security through disarmament. In particular, in view of the work done this year by the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, we believe that as a basis for future work by the Conference on Disarmament in this area next year negotiations could be held on draft articles for a convention to prohibit radiological weapons and possible elements related to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

The work of the Conference will be more effective if it has clearly defined priorities and if the most urgent and topical issues are included in its agenda. It is vital for the Conference on Disarmament to adapt itself to the new international situation and to help all it can to consolidate international peace. Of course for this purpose new initiatives will be required, new approaches. We believe that due attention should be given to the comments made by the delegation of Sweden at an earlier plenary meeting, to the effect that we need to take a fresh look at the membership of the Conference and to negotiate on expanding it. The world is changing, and we must make more effective use of the enormous potential embodied in the Conference on Disarmament. Ukraine intends to become a participant in the Geneva multilateral negotiations on disarmament and is ready to contribute to work on the important tasks facing this important international body, the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Ukraine for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Shah.

Mr. SHAH (India): I had not intended to speak this morning but I am doing so in the light of the statement that you made earlier, Mr. President, on behalf of the Australia Group. It is indeed no secret that my Government and that of many developing countries consider unilateral action of this type as discriminatory and hampering the economic and technological development of developing countries. We have always urged that solutions to concerns that may have prompted the activities of the Australia Group lie in multilateral arrangements and agreements arrived at through negotiations and universal participation and not in unilateral actions. We have also indicated repeatedly that there is no place for restraints on international cooperation or export controls by countries acting together outside the convention, once the convention comes into effect. It is with this in mind that amendments to article XI have been presented in the context of the CWC negotiations.

It is heartening that the statement just made by you on behalf of the Australia Group indicates the willingness of the Group to remove measures which restrict international cooperation and trade in the chemical field, even though it is related to fulfilment of certain conditions. While this statement of intention is indicative of the recognition of our concerns and goes some way towards addressing our apprehensions regarding the Australia Group, it is the belief of my delegation that the intent behind this statement should be reflected adequately in article XI of the convention, as and when the present negotiations on WP.400/Rev.1 conclude. It is also my hope that the statement which you read out on behalf of the Australia Group will become an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

Before I conclude, Sir, let me take the opportunity to present my own personal tribute to you for the stewardship of the Conference on Disarmament during the month that you have been President and the contributions that you have made to the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Are there any other representatives wishing to speak at this stage? I do not see any. As I informed you at the plenary meeting of 30 July, I now put before the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/1159. I see no objection to that report and I shall consider therefore that the Conference adopts it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The secretariat has circulated the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. This timetable is of course indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today. As announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold informal open-ended consultations, in this room and with interpretation services, to consider pending questions relating to the draft annual report to the General Assembly. May I also, on behalf of Ambassador Batsanov, remind delegations that open-ended consultations on editing and drafting for the CWC exercise will take place now in room V?

I have no other business, so I will proceed to adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 11 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.